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Abstract
Generic rst-order logic (GFOL) is a rst-order logic parameter-
ized with terms dened axiomatically (rather than constructively),
by requiring them to only provide generic notions of free variable
and substitution satisfying reasonable properties. GFOL has a com-
plete Gentzen system generalizing that of FOL. An important frag-
ment of GFOL, called HORN2, possesses a much simpler Gentzen
system, similar to traditional context-based derivation systems of
λ-calculi. HORN2 appears to be sufcient for dening virtually any
λ-calculi (including polymorphic and type-recursive ones) as theo-
ries inside the logic. GFOL endows its theories with a default loose
semantics, complete for the specied calculi.
Categories and Subject Descriptors F.4.1 [Mathematical Logic]:
Lambda calculus and related systems, Model theory, Proof theory
General Terms Theory, Languages
Keywords generic rst-order logic, substitution, λ-calculus
1. Introduction
First-order logic (FOL) is one of the best-established logics in com-
puter science. The models of FOL, called rst-order structures, as
well as its complete Gentzen deduction system are well understood
and intuitive, thus making FOL an attractive formalism with many
applications in specication and verication of systems, data-bases,
automated reasoning, etc. Problems can be represented as FOL the-
ories, i.e., as sets of FOL formulae over corresponding operational
and relational symbols; then FOL provides, in a uniform way, ap-
propriate models together with complete deduction rules.
FOL does not allow variables to be bound in terms (but only
in formulae, via quantiers), thus providing a straightforward no-
tion of substitution in terms. On the other hand, most calculi that
are used in the domain of programming languages, and not only, are
crucially based on the notion of binding of variables in terms: terms
export only a subset of their variables, their free variables, that
can be substituted. Because of their complex formulation for terms,
these calculi cannot be naturally dened as FOL theories. Conse-
quently, they need to dene their own models and deduction rules,
and to state their own theorems of completeness, not always easy to
prove. In other words, they are presented as entirely new logics, as
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opposed to theories in an existing logic, thus incurring all the draw-
backs (and boredom) of repeating denitions and proofs following
generic, well-understood patterns, but facing new details.
In this paper we dene term-generic rst-order logic, or simply
generic rst-order logic (GFOL), as a rst-order logic parameter-
ized by any terms that come with abstract notions of free variable
and substitution. More precisely, in GFOL terms are elements in a
generic set Term including a subset Var whose elements are called
variables, that comes with functions FV : Term → Pf (Var) and
Subst : Term× TermVar→Term for free variables and substitution,
respectively, that satisfy some expected properties. GFOL models
provide interpretations of terms that satisfy, again, some reasonable
properties. We show that GFOL admits a complete Gentzen-like de-
duction system, which is syntactically very similar to that of FOL;
its proof of completeness modies the classic proof of complete-
ness for FOL to use the generic notions of term, free variables, sub-
stitutions and their generic properties. Extensions of GFOL with
equality and with multiple sorts are also discussed.
By not committing to any particular denition of term, GFOL
can be instanciated to different types of terms, such as, e.g., stan-
dard FOL terms, or λ-terms, or different categories of typed λ-
terms, etc. When instanciated to standard FOL terms, GFOL be-
comes, as expected, precisely FOL. However, when instanciated to
more complex terms, e.g., the terms of λ-calculus, GFOL becomes
a logic where a particular calculus is a particular theory. For exam-
ple, the GFOL formulae for extensionality in untyped λ-calculus
and for typing of abstractions in simply-typed λ-calculus can be
∀x, y.(∀z.x z = y z)⇒ x = y and
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t′))⇒ typeOf (λx : t.X, t→ t′)
where x, y, z and t, t′ denote data and type variables, respectively,
and X denotes a data term. This way, a specication of a calculus
in GFOL brings a meaningful complete semantics for that calculus,
because the axioms are stated about some models, the content of
the axioms making the models desirable. Indeed, GFOL models
are blank models in the sense that they are only required to
interpret the terms in a way that is consistent with substitution  it
is the axioms that personalize the models; e.g., the above typing
rule asks that, in any desirable model, λx : t.X has type t → t′
whenever X has type t′ independently of the choice of x of type t.
Even though the completeness (being equivalent to semi-
decidability) of a fragment of a logic (whose syntax is decid-
able) follows from the completeness of the richer logic, there are
good reasons to develop complete proof systems for certain par-
ticular sublogics as well. Besides a better understanding and self-
containment of the sublogic, one important reason is the granular-
ity of proofs. Indeed, proofs of goals in the sublogic that use the
proof-system of the larger logic may be rather long and junkish
and may look articial in the context of the sublogic. For example,
equational logic admits a very intuitive complete proof system [4],
that simply replaces equals by equals, thus avoiding the more
intricate rst-order proofs. An important goal of this paper is to
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also investigate conditions under which sublogics of GFOL admit
specialized coarse-granularity proof systems.
It appears that a certain fragment of GFOL, that we call HORN2,
is sufcient for calculi-specication purposes. HORN2 consists of
GFOL sentences of the form
∀y.(∀x.Vni=1ai(x, y)⇒ bi(x, y))⇒ c(y)
with ai, bi, c atomic formulae (x and y denote tuples of variables),
i.e., generalized Horn implications whose conditions are them-
selves Horn implications. We show that, under a certain reason-
able proof-theoretic restriction that we call amenability, a HORN2
theory admits a complete Gentzen system that implements each
HORN2 formula as above into a deduction rule of the form
Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for any i = 1 . . . n
Γ . c(T )
where z is a fresh tuple of variables replacing x, and T is a tuple of
terms substituting y.
Completeness of HORN2 has, as particular cases, term-generic
versions of completeness results for conditional-equational [4],
Horn [17], and extensional [24] logics. Even more importantly, this
completeness result qualies HORN2 as a higher-level notation for
describing derivation systems for calculi, as it enables one to faith-
fully recover the original proof systems of the specied calculi in a
uniform way, from their HORN2 theories. For instance, the HORN2
deduction rule corresponding to the previously mentioned typing
axiom is the familiar context-based typing rule for abstractions:
Γ, typeOf (z, t) . typeOf (T, t′)
Γ . typeOf (λz : t.T, t→ t′) , where z is fresh w.r.t. Γ.
(Above, we viewed the type declaration z : t as an atomic formula
typeOf (z, t), of the same category with typeOf (λz: t.T, t → t′);
note that the freshness assumption coincides with the usual require-
ment that z does not occur on the left of a type declaration in Γ, in
order to avoid conicts.) The HORN2 notation is not only compact
and syntactic-detail-free (like the one advocated by HOAS [19]),
but also, by its very nature, model-theoretically meaningful.
Our main two contributions in this paper are:
• We show that the development of rst-order logic is largely or-
thogonal to the particular syntax of terms. While previous work
dealing with general terms models binding explicitly, we de-
velop a logic, GFOL, that abstracts away bindings by consid-
ering terms as black-boxes that export substitutions and free
variables; all particular known terms with bindings satisfy the
GFOL generic axioms; and
• We provide a convenient notation and intuition for dening λ-
calculi, that encourages a semantic specication style. GFOL
endows the specied calculi with a default complete semantics,
via the GFOL models of their dening theory.
Regarding the latter point, an early disclaimer is in order. The se-
mantics that GFOL brings for the specied calculi falls into the cat-
egory of loose, or logical semantics. Examples of loose semantics
for λ-calculi include: (so called) syntactic models for untyped
λ-calculus, Henkin models for simply-typed λ-calculus, Kripke-
style models for recursive types, and Girard's qualitative domains
and Bruce-Meyer-Mitchell models for System F, not to mention
all their categorical variants. For extensive presentations of these
and many other loose semantics, we recommend the monographs
[3, 10, 15]. For a particular calculus dened as a GFOL theory, the
implicit GFOL semantics has all the advantages, but, naturally, also
all the drawbacks, of loose semantics. It is not the concern of this
paper to advocate for a loose or for a xed-model semantics, es-
pecially because we believe that there is no absolute answer. What
we consider to be a particularly appealing aspect of GFOL seman-
tics though is its uniform, calculus-independent nature. And the
general-purpose GFOL semantics tends to be equivalent to the
domain-specic ones developed for various calculi.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
introduces GFOL (syntax, models and some properties), its frag-
ment HORN2, and complete Gentzen systems for them. Section 3
presents and discusses specications of various λ-calculi. Section 4
compares, for untyped λ-calculus and System F, their ad hoc com-
plete semantics already dened in the literature with this GFOL se-
mantics obtained automatically from their denition as HORN2
theories. Section 5 discusses related work, making room for GFOL
in the extensively studied eld of general approaches to represent-
ing λ-calculi. A short concluding section ends the paper.
We have exiled all the proofs into Appendix E.
2. Term-Generic First-Order Logic
We introduce a generic notion of rst-order term, axiomatized by
means of free variables and substitution, purposely not committing
to any concrete syntax for terms. Then we show our rst novel re-
sult in this paper, namely that the development of rst-order logic
essentially does not depend on the syntax of terms, but only on
the properties of substitution. Additionally, as shown in Section
3, various forms of typed and untyped λ-calculi naturally fall into
our framework by properly instanciating the generic notion of term
(and implicitly of free variable and substitution). To keep the dis-
cussion notationally simple, we rst develop the logic in an un-
sorted form and without equality, an later sketch an order-sorted
extension.
2.1 Term Syntax
DEFINITION 1. Let Var be a countably innite set of variables. A
term syntax over Var consists of the following data:
(a) A countably innite set Term such that Var ⊆ Term,
whose elements are called terms;
(b) A mapping FV : Term → Pf (Var); elements of FV(T )
are called free variables, or simply variables, of T ;
(c) A mapping Subst : Term× TermVar → Term.
These are subject to the following requirements (x, T, T ′, θ, θ′ de-
note arbitrary variables, terms, and maps in TermVar, respectively):
(1) Subst(x, θ) = θ(x);
(2) Subst(T, 1Var) = T ; 1
(3) If θFV (T )= θ′FV (T ), then Subst(T, θ) = Subst(T, θ′);
(4) Subst(Subst(T, θ), θ′) = Subst(T, θ; θ′), where for
each x ∈ Var, (θ; θ′)(x) is, by denition, Subst(θ(x), θ′);
(5) FV (x) = {x};
(6) FV (Subst(T, θ)) =
S{FV (θ(x)) :x ∈ FV (T )}.
From here on we may write a term syntax as a tuple (Term,Var,FV,
Subst) or even just Term if the other components of the tuple are
understood from context. Note that we assume the notion of term
coming together with a notion of substitution which is compos-
able (condition (4) above). Therefore, in our examples of calculi
with bindings, we shall consider α-equivalence classes of terms
rather than bare terms, a reasonable assumption when working at
the logical, and not the implementation, level. For distinct vari-
ables x1, . . . , xn, we write [T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn] for the function
Var → Term that maps each xi to Ti for i = 1, n and all
the other variables to themselves, and T [T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn] for
Subst(T, [T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn]).
PROPOSITION 1. The following hold:
1. x 6∈ FV(T ) implies T [T ′/x] = T ;
1 Here and elsewhere, by language abuse, we let 1Var denote the inclusion
mapping of Var into Term.
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2. y[T/x] = T if y = x and y[T/x] = y otherwise;
3. FV(T [T ′/x]) = FV(T ) \ {x} ∪ FV(T ′);
4. T [y/x][z/y] = T [z/x] if y 6∈ FV(T );
5. T [y/x][x/y] = T if y 6∈ FV(T ).
2.2 First-Order Logic over a Term Syntax
DEFINITION 2. A generic rst-order language consists of a term
syntax (Term,Var,FV, Subst) together with a countable ranked set
Π = (Πn)n∈IN , of relation symbols.
If Term is a term syntax as above, then we write generic rst-order
languages as (Term,Π); if more components of the term syntax are
relevant for a given context, then we can also mention them in the
tuple, e.g., (Term,Var,Π) or (Term,Var,FV,Π, Subst), etc.
DEFINITION 3. A GFOL model is a triple (A, (AT )T∈Term,
(Api)pi∈Π), such that:
(a) A is a set, called the carrier set.
(b) For each T ∈ Term, AT is a mapping AVar → A such that:
(i) Ax(ρ) = ρ(x);
(ii) For each ρ and ρ′ such that ρFV(T )= ρ′ FV(T ), it holds
that AT (ρ) = AT (ρ′);
(iii) ASubst(T, θ)(ρ) = AT (Aθ(ρ)), where for each θ ∈ TermVar,
Aθ : A
Var → AVar is dened by Aθ(ρ)(x) = Aθ(x)(ρ).
(c) For each pi ∈ Πn, Api is an n-ary relation on A.
Note that, unlike in classical FOL models where the interpretation
of terms is built from operations, in GFOL models the interpreta-
tion of terms is assumed (in the style of Henkin models). However,
due to the axioms ruling these interpretations, when instanciated to
FOL terms, GFOL yields essentially the same models.
Term can be organized as a model (Term, (TermT )T∈Term,
(Termpi)pi∈Π) in many ways, corresponding to the choice of rela-
tions Termpi , by letting TermT (ρ) be Subst(T, ρ). These are indeed
models, since conditions (i)-(iii) from the model denition coincide
in this case with (1), (3) and (4) in the term syntax denition. Any
such model will be henceforth called a (GFOL) Herbrand model.
If one denes model homomorphisms as expected, then one gets
that the Herbrand model with all relations empty is free over X in
the category of models and model homomorphisms. However, we
shall not be interested in such categorical/algebraic aspects here.
Above, and from now on, we let x, xi, y, u, v, etc., range over
variables, T, Ti, T ′, etc., over terms, ρ, ρ′, etc., over valuations in
AVar, and pi, pi′, etc., over relation symbols. Formulae are dened
the usual way, starting from atomic formulae pi(T1, . . . , Tn) and
applying connectives ∧,¬ and quantier ∀. We let Formula denote
the set of formulae. For each formula ϕ, the set Aϕ ⊆ AVar, of
valuations that make ϕ true in A, is dened recursively on the
structure of formulae as follows:
• ρ ∈ Api(T1,...,Tn) iff (AT1(ρ), . . . , ATn(ρ)) ∈ Api;
• ρ ∈ A¬ϕ iff ρ 6∈ Aϕ;
• ρ ∈ Aϕ∧ψ iff ρ ∈ Aϕ and ρ ∈ Aψ;
• ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ iff ρ[x← a] ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A.
If ρ ∈ Aϕ we say that A satises ϕ under valuation ρ and write
A |=ρ ϕ. IfAϕ = AVar we say thatA satises ϕ and writeA |= ϕ.
Given a set of formulae Γ,A |= Γ iffA |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ. Above,
and from now on, we let ϕ,ψ, χ range over arbitrary formulae and
A over arbitrary models.
DEFINITION 4. For each formula ϕ, the set FV(ϕ), of its free
variables, is dened recursively as follows:
• FV(pi(T1, . . . , Tn)) = FV(T1) ∪ . . . ∪ FV(Tn);
• FV(¬ϕ) = FV(ϕ);
• FV(ϕ ∧ ψ) = FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ);
• FV(∀x.ϕ) = FV(ϕ) \ {x}.
Note that, since FV(T ) is nite for each term T , FV(ϕ) is also
nite for each formula ϕ. A sentence is a closed formula ϕ, i.e., one
with FV(ϕ) = ∅. A theory, or a specication, is a set of sentences.
DEFINITION 5. Substitution of terms for variables in formulae,
Subst : Formula× TermVar → Formula, is dened as follows:
• Subst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn), θ) = pi(Subst(T1, θ), . . . , Subst(Tn, θ));
• Subst(¬ϕ, θ) = ¬Subst(ϕ, θ);
• Subst(ϕ ∧ ψ, θ) = Subst(ϕ, θ) ∧ Subst(ψ, θ);
• Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) = ∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]), where z is the least
variable2 not in FV(ϕ) ∪S{θ(y) : y ∈ FV(ϕ)}.
For substitution in formulae we adopt notational conventions simi-
lar to the ones about substitution in terms, e.g., ϕ[T/x].
DEFINITION 6. α-equivalence of formulae, written ≡α, is dened
to be the least relation R ⊆ Formula× Formula satisfying:
• pi(T1, . . . , Tn) R pi(T1, . . . , Tn);
• ¬ϕ R ¬ψ if ϕ R ψ;
• ϕ ∧ ϕ′ R ψ ∧ ψ′ if ϕ R ψ and ϕ′ R ψ′;
• ∀x.ϕR ∀y.ψ if ϕ[z/x]Rψ[z/y] for some z 6∈FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ).
Thus GFOL is a logic generic only w.r.t. terms - formulae are con-
crete rst-order formulae over generic terms, with a concrete
(and not generic) notion of α-equivalence, standardly constructed
on top of the identity of terms and using the quantier bindings;
however, in concrete cases involving bindings, the identity of terms
is itself α-equivalence w.r.t. term bindings.
For the following proposition, recall the denitions, for a model
A and two mappings θ, θ′ : Var → Term, of the composition
θ; θ′ : Var → Term and of the mapping Aθ : AVar → AVar:
• (θ; θ′)(x) = Subst(θ(x), θ′);
• Aθ(ρ)(x) = Aθ(x)(ρ).
PROPOSITION 2. The following hold:
1. If ρFV(ϕ)= ρ′FV(ϕ), then ρ ∈ Aϕ iff ρ′ ∈ Aϕ;
2. ρ ∈ ASubst(ϕ, θ) iff Aθ(ρ) ∈ Aϕ;
3. ϕ ≡α ψ implies Aϕ = Aψ;
4. ϕ ≡α ψ implies FV(ϕ) = FV(ψ);
5. ≡α is an equivalence;
6. ϕ ≡α Subst(ϕ, 1Var);
7. y 6∈ FV(ϕ) implies ϕ[y/x][z/y] ≡α ϕ[z/x];
8. x 6∈ FV(ϕ) implies ϕ[T/x] ≡α ϕ;
9. ϕ ≡α ψ implies Subst(ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(ψ, θ);
10. θFV(ϕ)= θ′FV(ϕ) implies Subst(ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(ϕ, θ′);
11. Subst(ϕ, θ; θ′) ≡α Subst(Subst(ϕ, θ), θ′);
12. ϕ ≡α ϕ′ andψ ≡α ψ′ implies:¬ϕ ≡α ¬ϕ′,ϕ∧ψ ≡α ϕ′∧ψ′,
∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀x.ϕ′.
Thus≡α is an equivalence, preserves satisfaction and the free vari-
ables, and is compatible with substitution and language constructs
(points (5), (3), (4), (9), (12) above). Hereafter, we shall identify
formulae moduloα-equivalence, since mappings FV , Subst,A and
those that build formulae are well dened on equivalence classes.
2 One may interpret the least as having the least index, where we
assume an indexing on the (countable) set of variables; we pick the least
variable in order to make a choice - any variable with the mentioned
property would do.
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Examples
FOL. As expected, classical FOL is an instance of GFOL. In-
deed, let (Var,Σ,Π) be a rst-order language (possibly with
equality - see Subsection 2.3), where Var is a countably in-
nite set of variables, and Σ = (Σn)n∈IN and Π = (Πn)n∈IN
are ranked sets of operation and relation symbols. Let Term
be the term syntax consisting of ordinary rst-order terms over
Σ and Var with FV : Term → Pf (Var) giving all the vari-
ables in each term (all variables are free in FOL terms) and
Subst : Term × TermVar → Term the normal substitution on FOL
terms (no precautions need to be taken here, since there is no vari-
able capture). Dene a generic rst-order language as (Term,Π).
A classical FOL model (A, (Aσ)σ∈Σ, (Api)pi∈Π) yields a GFOL
model (A, (AT )T∈Term, (Api)pi∈Π) by dening the meaning of
terms as derived operations. Conversely, from a GFOL model
(A, (AT )T∈Term, (Api)pi∈Π), one can extract a FOL model by
dening Aσ : An → A as Aσ(a1, . . . , an) = Aσ(x1,...,xn)(ρ),
where x1, . . . , xn are distinct variables and ρ is a valuation that
maps each xi to ai. (The denition of Aσ does not depend on the
choice of the xi's.) The two model mappings are mutually inverse
and preserve satisfaction. Thus, for this particular choice of terms,
GFOL yields FOL.
A Formula-Typed Logic. FOL is a trivial instance of GFOL. How-
ever, GFOL terms may be arbitrarily exotic. Besides terms of var-
ious λ-calculi (that will be discussed in Section 3), one may also
have terms that interfere with formulae in non-trivial ways, as
shown by the following example, where terms may abstract vari-
ables having formulae as types. Let (Var,Σ,Π) be a rst-order lan-
guage and Term and Formula be dened mutually recursively:
Term ::= Var | Σ(Term, . . . , Term) | Term〈Term〉
λVar :Formula. Term
Formula ::= Term = Term | Π(Term, . . . , Term) | ¬Formula
Formula ∧ Formula | ∀Var.Formula
where productions Term ::= Σ(Term, . . . , Term) and Formula ::=
Π(Formula, . . . ,Formula) have the restriction that the number of
Term's equals the rank of the corresponding operation in Σ or
relation in Π. The free variables of terms are dened recursively
by FV(λx :ϕ.T ) = (FV(T )∪FV(ϕ)) \ {x} and on the other term
constructs as expected, and term α-equivalence and substitution as
expected. It is easy to check that terms up to α-equivalence form a
GFOL term syntax. Moreover, even though formulae were dened
recursively together with the terms, they are still nothing but rst-
order formulae over the terms, hence they fall into the framework of
GFOL. This logic can be seen as an extremely-typed λ-calculus,
and is itself powerful enough to capture several forms of typed
calculi.
2.3 GFOL with Equality
A generic rst-order language with equality is a generic rst-
order language that has an emphasized binary relation symbol =,
interpreted in all models as the equality relation. All the other
concepts remain the same.
GFOL with equality is an important variant of GFOL and will
prove appropriate for conveniently capturing various λ-calculi,
where equality plays a central role together with typing/kinding.
Since typing will be dened as a binary relation which is implic-
itly compatible with equality in our framework, type preservation
will hold by default in calculi specied in GFOL with equality (see
Section 3.)
2.4 Many-Sorted and Order-Sorted GFOL
The notions of a term syntax and term-generic rst-order languages
have rather straightforward many-sorted and order-sorted general-
izations. We next sketch an order-sorted version of GFOL, which
also covers the many-sorted case. Order-sorted GFOL generalizes
order-sorted equational logic [9, 22].
Let S = (S,<) be a xed poset. Elements of S are called sorts,
and < is called the subsort relation. We assume that any two sorts
s, s′ having a common subsort (i.e., a sort s′′ with s′′ < s and
s′′ < s′), also have a greatest common subsort, denoted s ∧ s′. An
S-sorted set is a family of sets A = (As)s∈S such that As ⊆ As′
whenever s < s′. Let All(A) denote the set
S
s∈S As. We call A
unambiguous if As ∩ As′ = As∧s′ if s and s′ have a common
subsort, and As ∩ As′ = ∅ otherwise. Note that an unambiguous
S-sorted set A can be recovered from All(A) and the relation has
sort between elements of All(A) and S. Let A = (As)s∈S and
B = (Bs)s∈S be two S-sorted sets. A is included in B, written
A ⊆ B, if As ⊆ Bs for all s ∈ S. An S-sorted mapping between
A and B is a family of mappings (hs : As → Bs)s∈S such that
hs is a restriction and corestriction of hs′ whenever s < s′. Let
Map(A,B) denote the set of S-sorted mappings between A and
B. For convenience, we dene the intersection of an S-sorted set
A = (As)s∈S and an (unsorted) set D as A ∩D = (As ∩D)s∈S .
Let Var be an unambiguous, sortwise countably innite S-
sorted set of variables. An S-sorted term syntax over Var consists
of the following data:
(a) An unambiguous, sortwise countably innite S-sorted
set Term such that Var ⊆ Term;
(b) A mapping FV :All(Term)→ Pf (All(Var));
(c) A mapping Subst : All(Term) × All(Term)All(Var) →
All(Term) such that, for each s ∈ S, T ∈ Terms and
θ ∈ All(Term)All(Var), Subst(T, θ) ∈ Terms,
subject to the following requirements (where x, T, T ′, θ, θ′ denote
arbitrary variables, terms, and maps in All(Term)All(Var), respec-
tively):
(1) Subst(x, θ) = θ(x);
(2) Subst(T, 1All(Var)) = T ;
(3) If θFV (T )= θ′FV (T ), then Subst(T, θ) = Subst(T ′, θ);
(4) Subst(Subst(T, θ), θ′) = Subst(T, θ; θ′), where for
each x ∈ Var, (θ; θ′)(x) is, by denition, Subst(θ(x), θ′);
(5) FV (x) = {x};
(6) FV (Subst(T, θ)) =
S{FV (θ(x)) :x ∈ FV (T )}.
An S-sorted generic rst-order language consists of the following:
an unambiguous, sortwise countably innite S-sorted set Var; an
S-sorted term syntax Term over Var; a countable S∗-ranked set
Π = (Πw)w∈S∗ , of relation symbols. A GFOL model is a triple
(A, (AT )T∈Term, (Api)pi∈Π), such that:
(a) A is an S-sorted set;
(b) For each pi ∈ Πs1...sn , Api ⊆ As1 × . . .×Asn ;
(c) For each T ∈ All(Term), AT is a mapping Map(Var, A) →
All(A) such that whenever T ∈ Terms, AT (ρ) ∈ As for all
ρ ∈ Map(Var, A) and:
(i) If x ∈ Vars, then Ax(ρ) = ρs(x);
(ii) ASubst(T, θ)(ρ) = AT (Aθ(ρ)), where for each θ ∈
All(Term)All(Var), Aθ : Map(Var, A) → Map(Var, A) is
dened by Aθ(ρ)s(x) = Aθ(x)(ρ) if x ∈ Vars;
(iii) For each ρ, ρ′ ∈ Map(Var, A) such that ρMap(Var,A)∩FV(T )=
ρ′Map(Var,A)∩FV(T ), it holds that AT (ρ) = AT (ρ′).
Now rst-order formulae are dened as usual. All the concepts
and results about GFOL in this paper, including completeness of
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various proof systems for various fragments of the logic, can be
easily (but admittedly tediously) extended to the many-sorted and
order-sorted cases.
2.5 GFOL Gentzen System and Completeness
Next we show that the axiomatic properties of the generic notions
of free variable and substitution in GFOL provide enough infras-
tructure for proving generic versions of classical FOL results. We
are interested in a completeness theorem here, but other model-
theoretic results could be generalized as well. We shall use the same
cut-free Gentzen system as the one usually given in the classical
setting [7]. It is worth mentioning that our system rather looks the
same than is the same to the classical one, since in the tables below
T and [T/x] denote generic terms and substitution.
We x a generic rst-order language (Term,Π). A sequent is
a pair written Γ . ∆, with Γ and ∆ (at most) countable sets of
formulae, called the antecedent and the succedent of the sequent.
The sequent Γ . ∆ is called tautological if for each model A,T
ϕ∈Γ Aϕ ⊆
S
ψ∈∆ Aψ , and falsiable if it is not tautological. A
rule is a pair HS consisting of a sequent S and a (possibly empty)
list of sequents H . If H = · (i.e., it is empty) we call HS an axiom.
The notion of a proof tree for a Gentzen system is dened the usual
way - its nodes are labelled with sequents, in a way that is consistent
with the rules: if a node is labelled with S, then its descendants, if
they exist, are labelled with the elements of H , where HS is a rule
in the Gentzen system. A completed proof tree is one which has all
its leaves labeled with axioms. A rule HS is sound if whenever all
sequents in H are tautological, S is tautological too. A sequent is
provable in a Gentzen system if it is the root of a completed proof
tree. A Gentzen system is sound, if all its provable sequents are
tautological, and complete if all tautological sequents are provable.
Note that soundness of a Gentzen system is equivalent to soundness
of each of its rules.
We consider the Gentzen system, say G, given by the following
rule schemes (we write Γϕ instead of Γ ∪ {ϕ}):
Left Right
Γ . ∆ ϕ
Γ¬ϕ . ∆
Γ ϕ . ∆
Γ . ∆ ¬ϕ (¬)
Γ ϕ ψ . ∆
Γ ϕ ∧ ψ . ∆
Γ . ∆ ϕ , Γ . ∆ ψ
Γ . ∆ ϕ ∧ ψ (∧)
Γ ∀x.ϕ ϕ[T/x] . ∆
Γ ∀x.ϕ . ∆
Γ . ∆ ϕ[y/x]
Γ . ∆ ∀x.ϕ
y not free in
Γ,∆, ∀x.ϕ (∀)
·
Γ . ∆
if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ (Ax)
Given a theory E, a sequent Γ . ∆ is called E-tautological if for
each model A |= E, Tϕ∈Γ Aϕ ⊆ Sψ∈∆ Aψ . The above Gentzen
system is meant to entail tautological, i.e., ∅-tautological, GFOL
sequents, and thus is not parameterized by any xed theoryE. Note
however that, for a countable theory E, Γ . ∆ is E-tautological iff
(Γ ∪E) . ∆ is tautological, and thus the case of a xed countable
theory E can be covered by adding E to the antecedent of the
desired sequent. Gentzen systems specialized for xed theories,
that apply the axioms of the theory directly as rules, are discussed
in Subsection 2.6.
THEOREM 1. Gentzen system G is sound and complete for GFOL.
To obtain a Gentzen system for GFOL with equality, we add to G:
Γ . ∆T = T
Γ . ∆
(Inst-Re)
Γ . ∆T1 = T2 , ΓT2 = T1 . ∆
Γ . ∆
(Inst-Symm)
Γ . ∆T1 = T2 , Γ . ∆T2 = T3 ,
ΓT1 = T3 . ∆
Γ . ∆
(Inst-Trans)
Γ . ∆T1 = T ′1 , . . . , Γ . ∆Tn = T
′
n ,
Γ . ∆pi(T1, . . . , Tn) , Γpi(T ′1, . . . , T
′
n) . ∆
Γ . ∆
(Inst-Comppi)
Γ . ∆T1 = T2 , Γ T [T1/x] = T [T2/x] . ∆
Γ . ∆
(Inst-Subst)
We call these the equality rules. Note that the rules in the above
two tables make full sense in our generic framework, since concrete
syntax of terms is not required; all that is needed here are abstract
notions of term and substitution. In concrete cases, congruence
w.r.t. various kinds of operations will be captured as particular cases
of (Inst-Subst). Let G= be this enriched Gentzen system.
THEOREM 2. G= is sound and complete for GFOL with equality.
The notation used for the equality rules, (Inst-. . .), comes from
regarding these rules as instances of some axiom-schemes, namely:
x = x (Re)
x = y ⇒ y = x (Symm)
x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z (Trans)
(x1 = y1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn = yn∧
pi(x1, . . . , xn))⇒ pi(y1, . . . , yn) (Comppi)
x = y ⇒ T [z ← x] = T [z ← y] (Subst)
Let Eql be the set of these equality axioms. The relationship be-
tween axioms and their associated rules will be exploited in the
following subsection, where we develop a more effective theory-
oriented Gentzen system for a fragment of GFOL.
2.6 The HORN2 Fragment of GFOL
We next consider a fragment of GFOL, called HORN2 because
it only allows formulae which are universally quantied implica-
tions whose conditions are themselves universally quantied im-
plications of atomic formulae. All our GFOL specications of cal-
culi with bindings in Section 3.1 will consist of HORN2 formulae.
As shown in the sequel, we can associate to these theories more
natural and intuitive proof systems, which resemble almost identi-
cally (modulo syntactic sugar modications and some built-in type
preservation properties) the corresponding original proof systems
of the calculi.
For convenience, we assume that the language also contains the
logical connectives > (zero-ary, corresponding to true) and ⇒
(binary, the logical implication) and that the Gentzen system G also
contains the rules
Γ . ∆ ϕ , Γ ψ . ∆
Γ ϕ⇒ ψ . ∆ ,
Γϕ . ∆ ψ
Γ . ∆ ϕ⇒ ψ , and
·
Γ . > .
> and ⇒ can be treated as derived connectives and the above
rules can be derived for them, but we prefer to take them here as
primitives. We take the convention that > is an atomic formula.
Clearly, G is still sound and complete.
In what follows, x denotes a tuple (x1, . . . , xn) of variables,
T a tuple (T1, . . . , Tn) of terms, and, for a formula ϕ, ϕ(x) in-
dicates that ϕ has all its free variables among {x1, . . . , xn}, with
ϕ(T ) denoting ϕ[T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn]. Because variables are par-
ticular terms, we take the liberty to use the notation ϕ(y) with two
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different meanings, depending on the context: either to indicate that
ϕ has its variables among {y1, . . . , yn}, case in which ϕ(y) is the
same as ϕ, or to denote the formula obtained from ϕ by substitut-
ing the variables x (assumed indicated previously by writing ϕ as
ϕ(x)) with the variables y.
Let HORN2 be the GFOL fragment given by the formulae:
∀y.
 
∀x.
n^
i=1
(ai(x, y)⇒ bi(x, y))
!
⇒ c(y) (∗)
where ai, bi, c are atomic formulae. We call these HORN2-formulae.
When ai is > we write only bi(x, y) instead of ai(x, y) ⇒
bi(x, y), and call the formula extensional; if in addition x has
length 0, we obtain Horn formulae. When all bi's are > or n = 0,
we write c(y) instead of (∗). HORN2, extensional, and Horn sen-
tences are by denition universal closures of corresponding types
of formulae. We identify formulae with their universal closures
in theories. A theory E is called HORN2, extensional, or Horn if
it consists of corresponding types of sentences. Besides includ-
ing equational and Horn logics, HORN2 can dene any λ-calculus
(untyped, typed, polymorphic, etc.) as shown in Section 3.
We shall eventually only consider Horn consequences (in other
words, sequents Γ . d with Γ a nite set of atomic formulae and
d an atomic formula) of HORN2 specications, because only this
type of consequences are usually relevant for λ-calculi. Moreover,
all other HORN2 consequences can be deduced from these using
(generic forms of) the Constant Lemma and the Deduction Theo-
rem. We rst consider slightly more general sequents, namely ones
of the form Γ . ∆ with Γ and ∆ nite sets of atomic formulae.
Fix a HORN2 theoryE. Our goal next is to simplify and special-
ize with regard toE the Gentzen system G discussed in the previous
subsection. We rst provide some immediate simplications, based
on the following remarks:
1. There is no need for the rules involving negation, because
any provable negation-free sequent has a completed proof tree
whose sequents do not contain negation;
2. There is no change in the strength of provability if we accept as
axioms only those rules ·Γ . ∆ such that there exists an atomic
sentence in Γ ∩ ∆ instead of any sentence, atomic or not; this
is because whenever a sequent Γ . ∆ is such that there is a
compound formula ϕ in Γ ∩∆, then there is a non-axiom rule
which can be applied backwards to it such that all its (one or
two) upper sequents Γ′ . ∆′ have a strict subformula of ϕ in
Γ′ ∩∆′.
We obtain the following Gentzen system parameterized by E, de-
noted G′E , for entailing E-tautological sequents of the form Γ . ∆,
where Γ and ∆ are nite sets of atomic formulae:
·
Γ . ∆
if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ (Axiom)
Γai(z, T ) . ∆bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n, Γc(T ) . ∆
Γ . ∆
(Inst’-e)
In the rule (Inst’-e) above (the instance of e rule), e is a sentence
in E of the form (∗) (thus ai, bi, c are the atomic formulae that
build e), z is a fresh tuple of variables with the same length as x,
and T is a tuple of terms with the same length as y. Here as well
as in the other similar rules that we shall consider, we implicitly
assume that if ai is>, then we do not add it to Γ, and if bi is>, we
do not add the sequent Γai(z, T ) . ∆bi(z, T ) to the hypotheses.
Moreover, notice that if n = 0, the rule has only one hypothesis,
Γc(T ) . ∆.
As opposed to G, the system G′E is parameterized by a xed
theory E; the axioms e in E do not appear in sequents as such,
but lay on the background, yielding instance rules (Inst’-e).
Therefore G′E , and also all the other Gentzen systems dened later
in this subsection, are specialized for (arbitrary but xed) theories.
According to the discussion above, the following holds:
PROPOSITION 3. The Gentzen system G′E is (sound and) complete
for deducing E-tautological sequents Γ . ∆, where Γ and ∆ are
nite sets of atomic formulae.
The rule (Inst’-e) can be split into a simpler instance rule (Inst-e)
and a rule (Cut) as below:
Γai(z, T ) . ∆bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n
Γ . ∆c(T )
(Inst-e)
Γ . ∆d , Γd . ∆
Γ . ∆
(Cut)
Indeed, (Inst’-e) can immediately be simulated by (Inst-e) and
(Cut); conversely, by completeness of G′E and soundness of (Inst-
e) and (Cut), any proof using (Inst-e) and (Cut) instead of (Inst’-
e) can be performed in G′E . Let G0E denote the system consisting of
(Axiom), (Inst-e) and (Cut). We thus obtained the following:
PROPOSITION 4. The Gentzen system G0E is (sound and) complete
for deducing E-tautological sequents Γ . ∆, where Γ and ∆ are
nite sets of atomic formulae.
Rules like the above (Cut) are usually undesirable for many rea-
sons, among which their non-syntax-driven character due to the
appearance of the interpolant d out of nowhere. For us, this rule
is undesirable because it increases the succedent of the sequents,
thus not allowing one to only consider singleton antecedents lead-
ing to a simpler Gentzen system. Can (Cut) be always eliminated
from G0E? The answer is negative, as shown by the following non-
intuitionistic3 counterexample: E is {(a ⇒ b) ⇒ c, a ⇒ c}.
Then ∅ . c is provable in G0E : ∅ . c follows by (Cut) from ∅ . c a
and a . c; ∅ . c a follows by (Inst-((a ⇒ b) ⇒ c)) from a . a b,
the latter being an (Axiom); a . c follows by (Inst-(a⇒ c)) from
a . a, the latter being an (Axiom). (Note that indeed c is a seman-
tic consequence ofE.) On the other hand, G0E without (Cut) cannot
prove ∅ . c, as the reader can easily see. However, some theoriesE
allow for the elimination of (Cut), as shown below. Let GE be G0E
without (Cut), and G1E be G0E with (Cut) replaced by:
Γ . d , Γd . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Simple-Cut)
Also consider the following family of rules:
Γa(z, T ) . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Drop-(e, a))
where e is a sentence in E of the form (*), a(x, y) is one of the
ai's, z is a fresh tuple of variables, and T is a tuple of terms of the
same size as y. We next prove that the simpler-to-check closure of
GE under the (Drop-(e, a)) rules ensures its closure under (Cut),
hence allows for elimination of the latter rule from G0E .
3 Indeed, (Cut) could be eliminated if we considered an intuitionistic vari-
ant of GFOL; however, we do not get into this issue here.
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LEMMA 1. Assume that GE is closed under the rules (Drop-
(e, a)). If Γ . ∆1 ∪ ∆2 is derivable in GE , then either Γ . ∆1
or Γ . ∆2 is derivable in GE .
LEMMA 2. GE and G1E are equivalent (i.e., (Simple-Cut) can be
eliminated from G1E).
PROPOSITION 5. If GE is closed under the rules (Drop-(e, a)),
then it is also closed under (Cut), i.e., then GE is equivalent to
G0E .
Finally, we are ready to prove the completeness of a particularly
simple Gentzen system, for the case of certain HORN2 theories.
We let KE denote the system obtained from GE by restricting the
succedents to be singletons, i.e., the following system:
·
Γ . d
if d ∈ Γ (Axiom)
Γai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n
Γ . c(T )
(Inst-e)
THEOREM 3. If GE is closed under the rules (Drop-(e, a)), then
KE is (sound and) complete for deducing E-tautological sequents
Γ . d, with Γ nite set of atomic formulae and d atomic formula.
Theorem 3 extends seamlessly to cope with equality, since the
equality axioms Eql are HORN2 sentences themselves. (As men-
tioned before, the equality rules are obtained following the same
instanciation technique from the axioms Eql.)
Let G=E and K=E denote the systems G(E∪Eql) and K(E∪Eql),
regarded over the language with equality. We obtain the following,
as an immediate consequence of Theorem 3:
THEOREM 4. If G=E is closed under the rules (Drop-(e, a)),4 then
K=E is (sound and) complete for deducing, in the logic with equality,
E-tautological sequents of the form Γ . d, where Γ is a nite set of
sentences and d is a sentence.
We call a HORN2 theory E amenable if it satises the hypothesis
of Theorem 4 (G=E closed under (Drop-(e, a))).
Notice that, for the purpose of entailing sequents Γ . d, KE
and K=E are highly optimized Gentzen systems  they function
by directly applying the axioms of the theory E, and without the
need of carrying over intermediate results in the succedents of the
sequents. IfE is a Horn theory, one obtains the well-known Hilbert
system for Horn (and in particular, equational) logic: indeed, the
antecedent being xed in deductions, it can be omitted and thus the
Gentzen system becomes a Hilbert system, writing a
b
for Γ . a
Γ . b
and keeping an implicit account for the effect of the (Axiom) rule,
as any Hilbert system does. Thus, we obtained a derivation of the
completeness result for the Horn logic w.r.t. to its simple Hilbert
system from the one of FOL w.r.t. its more involved Gentzen
system. More generally, if E is an extensional theory, then there
are no (Drop-(e, a)) rules, hence E is also trivially amenable.
COROLLARY 1. IfE is an extensional theory, thenK=E is complete
for entailing E-tautological sequents of the form Γ . d, where Γ is
a nite set of sentences and d is a sentence.
The above results will be relevant for our calculi specications, as
an amenable Horn2 specication E of a calculus will recover, in
the system K=E , the represented calculus itself - see Section 3.2.
4 In these rules, e ranges over the equality axioms as well.
3. Specifying Calculi in HORN2
We here dene several λ-calculi as HORN2 theories; thus these
calculi fall under HORN2 in a rather direct way, just like group,
eld and vector-space theories fall under equational logic. Most of
the calculi below were taken from [20, 15, 10]. For untyped λ-
calculus, see [3]; System F was introduced in [8, 23], ML-style
polymorphism in [14], and Edinburgh LF in [11]. A polymorphic
calculus with units of measurement is studied in [12].
3.1 Specications of Calculi
Terms below are considered up to their α-equivalence; substitution
and free variables are standard, substitution acting on terms up
to α-equivalence, in a capture-avoiding fashion  the term syntax
axioms check easily in each case. We work in GFOL with equality.
We next recall some standard λ- and FOL- like notational con-
ventions that we obey as well. Since our examples have two kinds
of bindings (in terms and in formulae), we state these conventions
explicitly, to avoid further confusion: (1) Both terms and formu-
lae are considered up to α-equivalence. When an expression like
λx.X appears in an axiom, λx is assumed to bind any occur-
rence of x in X (note that λx. is well-dened on α-equivalence
classes, because X ≡α X ′ implies λx.X ≡α λx.X ′). (2) Term-
and formula- binding operators are assumed to bind as far as they
can: thus λx.x + x should be read as λx.(x + x) and ∀x.ϕ ∧ ψ
as ∀x.(ϕ ∧ ψ); the conjunction (∧) binds stronger than the impli-
cation (⇒). (3) Formulae are identied with the sentences that are
their universal closures, i.e., that quantify universally over all the
free variables of the formulae. Therefore, a more rigorous way to
write x = λy.x y and (λx.X)y = X[y/x] is ∀x.x = λy.x y
and ∀z.(λx.X)y = X[y/x] where z is the tuple of all variables
free in (λx.X)y = X[y/x]. (4) We use lower-case letters to de-
note variables and upper-case letters for terms. We call metavari-
ables the symbols that we use to denote variables or terms (e.g.,
x, y,X, Y ). Metavariables for variables and for terms are subject
to different conventions. When two metavariables x and y ap-
pear in the same axiom, they denote some xed, but distinct vari-
ables; therefore, e.g., x = λy.x y denotes a single GFOL sentence,
with x, y ∈ Var and x distinct from y (the choice of x and y is
immaterial thanks to α-equivalence of formulae, since we assume
an outer universal quantication, by convention 3). On the other
hand, a metavariable X denotes an arbitrary term, thus, e.g.,
(λx.X)Y = X[Y/x] is an axiom scheme representing a set of
formulae, one for each pair of terms (X,Y ) (for more on axiom
schemes see Appendix A); moreover, when X and Y appear in the
same axiom scheme (like above), they are not assumed distinct.
When do we use variables and when terms? We use terms when
there is no way to express the desired axiom as a single sentence. It
turns out that axioms like the η-rule, classically stated as an axiom
scheme (E = λy.E y with the side condition y 6∈ FV(E)), can
be written as a single formula x = λy.x y in GFOL; indeed, the
fact that x is independent of y is implicit in the way substitution
is dened in a capture-avoiding fashion on (α-equivalencies of)
terms. On the other hand, the β-rule cannot be written as a single
formula, being inherently an axiom scheme.
Untyped λ-Calculus (Uλ). An unsorted theory in HORN2, with
no relations except equality; terms are α-equivalence classes over
syntax Term ::= Var | Term Term | λVar.Term; axioms are:
(∀x.X = Y )⇒ λx.X = λx.Y (ξ)
(λx.X)x = X (β)
x = λy.x y (η)
Remarks: (1) (ξ) is a proper extensional sentence scheme, i.e., it
is not equivalent to one in a simpler fragment of GFOL, like Horn;
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note that x is ∀-bound in the left of ⇒, and λ-bound in the right,
in order to achieve the desired meaning: if X and Y are equal for
an arbitrary x, then they are equal as functions on x. Extensional
sentences appear to sufce for untyped calculi.
(2) The very simple syntax of our (β)-rule may seem strange at
rst sight. However, it has a good underlying intuition: a function
λx.X(x) applied to a value x yields X(x) - in the latter X(x),
the value x has substituted the variable, i.e., the formal parameter
x. It is common practice to let the same symbol denote both the
formal and the actual parameter. This brings no confusion,
since in the equation (λx.X)x = X all occurrences of x in the left
X are bound by λ, while the other occurrences of x are bound by
the outer universal quantier of the equation. Thus if we substitute
a term Y for x in this equation we get the more conventional
beta-rule (λx.X)Y = X[Y/x]. One may replace the (β) axiom
by any of its GFOL-equivalent forms (λx.X)y = X[y/x] and
(λx.X)Y = X[Y/x]; however, we nd the current form of (β)
quite elegant and compact.
(3) Non-extensional λ-calculus is obtained by removing (η).
(Simply-)Typed λ-Calculus (Tλ). Sorts type, data. Relation sym-
bol typeOf : data× type. Var = (Vartype,Vardata) = (TVar,DVar)
and Term = (Termtype, Termdata) = (TTerm,DTerm), where:
TTerm ::= TVar | TConst | TTerm→ TTerm
DTerm ::= DVar | DTerm DTerm | λDVar : TTerm.DTerm
x, y, X,Y , t, t′, and T, T ′ range over data variables, data terms,
type variables, and type terms, respectively. This convention will
apply to all specications extending this one. For clarity, we en-
close labels of typing formulae by square brackets (e.g., [App]),
and labels of equational rules by parentheses (e.g., (β)).
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t′))⇒ typeOf (λx : t.X, t→ t′) [Abs]
typeOf (x, t→ t′) ∧ typeOf (y, t)⇒ typeOf (x y, t′) [App]
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ X = Y )⇒ λx : t.X = λx : t.Y (ξ)
typeOf ((λx : t.X)x, t′)⇒ (λx : t.X)x = X (β)
typeOf (λy : t.x y, t′)⇒ x = λy : t.x y (η)
Remarks: (1) One usually also considers, besides the basic types
such as nat and bool (which are elements of TConst), some data
constants, such as 0, succ, +, or ifThenElse, with their assigned
types (e.g., typeOf (+, nat → nat → nat)) and dening equations
(e.g., x+succ(y) = succ(x+y)). To save space, we did not include
these in our specication, nor we shall include such straightforward
items in later specications.
(2) The axioms [Abs] and (ξ) show that rules changing the typ-
ing context can be modelled using proper HORN2 sentences, in a
semantically clean manner; for instance, [Abs] says that we can
type λx : t.X to t → t′ whenever X has type t′ for any value of
its argument x of type t. Syntactically, this approach simplies
the calculus, since it allows one to focus on the actual meaning of
axioms rather than on low-level details such as how to deal with
typing contexts, free or fresh variables, etc.
(3) We allow type variables and quantify them in formulae, but this
fact alone does not bring polymorphism, since we do not have ab-
straction over types. We can nevertheless use type variables to rea-
son about types in general, which is not possible in simply-typed
λ-calculus, so the HORN2 specication above is slightly more pow-
erful than simply-typed λ-calculus.
(4) Standard denitions of simply-typed λ-calculus make use of
typing contexts. Our HORN2 denition above does not make typing
contexts explicit; they appear implicitly during the derivation pro-
cess. A typing judgement of the form x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn . X : T
in the type-theoretic notation can be seen as syntactic sugar for
∀x1, . . . , xn.typeOf (x1, T1) ∧ typeOf (xn, Tn) ⇒ typeOf (X,T ).
Because of the built-in equality axioms, we allow equations be-
tween data terms which are not necessarily well-typed. For exam-
ple,X = X holds regardless of whetherX is well-typed. However,
the conditions in equations make sure that we cannot deduce any
equation X = Y , with X well-typed and Y non-well-typed. A
typed equation of the form x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn . X = Y : T
can be seen as syntactic sugar for (∀x1, . . . , xn.typeOf (x1, T1) ∧
typeOf (xn, Tn))⇒ (typeOf (X,T ) ∧ typeOf (Y, T ) ∧X = Y ).
(5) Since compatibility of typeOf with equality is a built-in prop-
erty of GFOL (and thus HORN2), our specication enjoys the type
preservation property (types are preserved by equalities) by de-
fault. That this property can be proved as a theorem in simply-typed
λ-calculus ensures the correctness of our specication. In general,
a property like type preservation is seen as a test for a calculus
to be sound. If one wants to actually specify the calculus without
this property and then prove it as a theorem, then one should use
HORN2 without equality and dene = as an ordinary relation.
(6) Here and elsewhere, we state the typing conditions for equations
as succinctly as possible; hence the above (β)-rule - its hypothe-
sis, typeOf ((λx : t.X)x, t′) is usually split in two: typeOf (λx :
t.X, t→ t′) ∧ typeOf (x, t). The latter are equivalent with the for-
mer, via the [App]-rule, and in fact the compact form gives the
essence of the hypothesis: the problematic term, (λx : t.X)x, is
well-typed. Moreover, we specify typing hypotheses for the equa-
tions only if needed, i.e., only if the equated terms are susceptible
of de-balancing typing. Thus in the case of (β),X is surely well-
typed whenever (λx : t.X)x is so; this way, with minimal precau-
tions, we avoid allowing equalities between a well-typed term and
a non-well-typed one. On the other hand, in the (ξ)-rule, provided
(∀x.typeOf (x, t) ⇒ X = Y ) holds, λx : t.X is well-typed iff
λx : t.Y is so, hence there is no need for any typing hypotheses.
This succinctness policy, with no spectacular results here, is useful
for more complicated calculi, such as Type:Type (see below).
Typed λ-Calculus with Recursion (Tλµ). Extends Tλ.
DTerm ::= . . . | µDVar : TTerm.DTerm
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t))⇒ typeOf (µx : t.X, t) [µ]
typeOf (µx : t.X, t)⇒ µx : t.X = X[µx : t.X/x] (µ)
System F (SF ). Extends Tλ.
TTerm ::= . . . | Π TVar. TTerm
DTerm ::= . . . | DTerm TTerm | λ TVar.DTerm
(∀t.typeOf (X,T ))⇒ typeOf (λt.X,Πt. T ) [T-Abs]
typeOf (x,Πt. T )⇒ typeOf (x t, T ) [T-App]
(∀t.X = Y )⇒ λt.X = λt.Y (Tξ)
typeOf (λt.X, t′)⇒ (λt.X)t = X (Tβ)
typeOf (λt.x t, t′)⇒ x = λt.x t (Tη)
Typed λ-Calculus with Subtyping (TλS). Extends Tλ. Adds a
new relation symbol, ≤: type× type.
typeOf (x, t) ∧ t ≤ t′ ⇒ typeOf (x, t′) [ST]
t ≤ t (Re-ST)
t ≤ t′ ∧ t′ ≤ t′′ ⇒ t ≤ t′′ (Trans-ST)
t1 ≤ t2 ∧ t′1 ≤ t′2 ⇒ (t2 → t′1) ≤ (t1 → t′2) (Arr-ST)
Typed λ-Calculus with Isorecursive Types (TλµT ). Extends Tλ.
TTerm ::= . . . | µ TVar. TTerm
DTerm ::= . . . | fold〈TTerm〉DTerm | unfold〈TTerm〉DTerm
typeOf (x, T [(µt.T )/t])⇒ typeOf (fold〈µt.T 〉x, µt.T ) [Fold]
typeOf (x, µt.T )⇒ typeOf (unfold〈µt.T 〉x, T [(µt.T )/t]) [Unfold]
unfold〈µt.T 〉(fold〈µt.T 〉x) = x (Inverse1)
fold〈µt.T 〉(unfold〈µt.T 〉x) = x (Inverse2)
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Subtyping Isorecursive Types. Extends both TλµT and TλS.
(∀t, t′.(t ≤ t′)⇒ (T ≤ T ′))⇒ µt.T ≤ µt′.T ′ (Amber)
Remark: The above axiom modeling the so-called Amber rule
is another example of a proper HORN2 formula, like the ones
for (ξ) and typing of abstraction. Again, the rule makes perfect
intuitive sense in this form with universally quantied hypothesis,
that avoids considering any typing context.
Typed λ-Calculus with Type Operators and Binding (Tλω).
Extends Tλ without [Abs] (which needs to be modied). Adds
new sort, kind, and new relation kindOf : type × kind. Var =
(Varkind,Vartype,Vardata) = (KVar, TVar,DVar) and Term =
(Termkind, Termtype, Termdata) =
(KTerm, TTerm,DTerm), where:
KTerm ::= ∗ | KVar | KTerm→ KTerm
TTerm ::= . . . | λ TVar : KTerm. TTerm
k, k′ range over kind variables.
(kindOf (t, ∗) ∧ (∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t′)))
⇒ typeOf (λx : t.X, t→ t′) [Abs]
kindOf (t, ∗) ∧ kindOf (t′, ∗)⇒ kindOf (t→ t′, ∗) [K-Arr]
(∀t.kindOf (t, k)⇒ kindOf (T, k′))⇒ kindOf (λt :k.T, k → k′) [K-Abs]
kindOf (t, k → k′) ∧ kindOf (t′, k)⇒ kindOf (t t′, k′) [K-App]
(∀t.kindOf (t, k)⇒ T = T ′)⇒ λt :k.T = λt :k.T ′ (Kξ)
kindOf ((λt :k.T )t, k′)⇒ (λt :k.T )t = T (Kβ)
typeOf (λt :k.t′ t, k′)⇒ t′ = λt :k.t′ t (Kη)
Remark: Kinding is usually considered together with type poly-
morphism, to provide simple abbreviations such as Pair = λt.λt′.
Πt′′.(t → t′ → t′′) → t′′ as an alternative to parametric abbrevi-
ations such as Pair t t′ = Πt′′.(t → t′ → t′′) → t′′. In our logic,
even the former abbreviations (usually kept in the meta-language -
see [20]) can be stated at the logical level in a straightforward way:
∀Pair.Pair = λt.λt′.Πt′′.(t→ t′ → t′′)→ t′′ ⇒ . . ..
A polymorphic calculus with units of measurement (TλU ). Ex-
tends Tλ. Adds a new sort, unit. Var = (Varunit,Vartype,Vardata) =
(UVar, TVar,DVar) and Term = (Termunit, Termtype, Termdata) =
(UTerm, TTerm,DTerm), where:
UTerm ::= . . . | UVar | 1 | UTerm · UTerm | UTerm−1
TTerm ::= . . . | QType UTerm | Π UVar. TTerm
DTerm ::= . . . | λUVar.DTerm | DTerm UTerm
u, u′, u′′ range over unit variables and U over unit terms.
(∀u.typeOf (X,T ))⇒ typeOf (λu.X,Πu.T ) [U-Abs]
typeOf (x,Πu.T )⇒ typeOf (xu, T ) [U-App]
u · u′ = u′ · u (Comm)
(u · u′) · u′′ = u · (u′ · u′′) (Assoc)
u · 1 = u (Id)
u · u−1 = 1 (Inv)
(∀u.X = Y )⇒ λu.X = λu.Y (U-ξ)
typeOf ((λu.X)u, t′)⇒ (λu.X)u = X (U-β)
typeOf (λu.x u, t′)⇒ x = λu.x u (U-η)
Remarks: (1) To make the calculus meaningful, one also needs to
consider basic units of measure, such as kg and m, as elements of
UTerm.
(2) QType is a set of quantitative basic types, such as nat or real,
for which it makes sense to consider units of measurement. Thus,
for instance, realm2 is the type of surfaces, while the type real
should be seen as the polymorphic type Πu.realu [12].
ML-Style Polymorphic λ-calculus (MLλ). Extends Uλ; the im-
ported sort is called data. Adds two sorts, type and typeScheme,
with type < typeScheme (thus we have an order-sorted setting)
and two relations, typeOf : data× typeScheme and moreGeneral :
typeScheme×typeScheme. Var = (VartypeScheme,Vartype, Vardata) =
(TSVar, TVar,DVar), with TVar ⊆ TSVar and Term = (TermtypeScheme,
Termtype, Termdata) = (TSTerm, TTerm,DTerm), where:
TSTerm ::= TSVar | TTerm | Π TVar. TSTerm
TTerm ::= TVar | TConst | TTerm→ TTerm
DTerm ::= . . . | let DVar = DTerm in DTerm
x, y / X range over data variables/terms, t, t′ / T over type vari-
ables/terms, and s, s′, s′′ / S over type-scheme variables/terms.
typeOf (x, s) ∧ moreGeneral(s′, s)⇒ typeOf (x, s′) [Inst]
(∀t.typeOf (x, S))⇒ typeOf (x,Πt.S) [Gen]
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t′))⇒ typeOf (λx.X, t→ t′) [Abs]
typeOf (y, s) ∧ (∀x.typeOf (x, s)⇒ typeOf (X, s′))
⇒ typeOf (let x = y in X, s′) [Let]
typeOf (x, t→ t′) ∧ typeOf (y, t)⇒ typeOf (x y, t′) [App]
typeOf (let x = y in X, t)⇒ let x = y in X = X[y/x] (Let)
moreGeneral(Πt.S, S) (MG1)
moreGeneral(s, s′) ∧ moreGeneral(s′, s′′)⇒ moreGeneral(s, s′′) (MG2)
Remarks: (1) The typing statement of the let construct uses type
scheme variables, hence allows for polymorphism.
(2) The relation of being more general is dened in a very simple
fashion; the rule (MG1) says that the type scheme Πt.S is more
general that S with any particular choice for the type t appearing
in S. Recall that the written formulae are meant to express their
universal closures, in particular are meant to be universally quanti-
ed over t, hence any possible occurrence of t in the second S of
moreGeneral(Πt.S, S) is in the scope of an outer universal quanti-
er; this is precisely what any particular choice means. (See also
the previous discussion on our β axiom.) (3) The typing rule [Gen]
says that if we can associate the type (scheme) S to x for any type
t, then we can regard the type S of x as polymorphic in t.
The Edinburgh LF Calculus with Dependent Types (LF ). Sorts
kind, typeFamily, object, and relations typeOf : object×typeFamily
and kindOf : typeFamily × kind. Var = (Varkind,VartypeFamily,
Varobject) = (KVar, TFVar,OVar) and Term = (Termkind,
TermtypeFamily, Termobject) = (KTerm, TFTerm,OTerm), where:
KTerm ::= KVar | type | ΠOVar:TFTermKTerm
TFTerm ::= TFVar | ΠOVar:TFTermTFTerm
λOVar : TFTerm.TFTerm | TFTerm OTerm
OTerm ::= OVar | λOVar : TFTerm.OTerm | OTerm OTerm
x, y andX,Y range over object variables and terms, t, t′ and T, T ′
over type-family variables and terms, and k, k′ and K,K′ over
kind variables and terms.
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ kindOf (T, type))⇒ kindOf (Πx:t.T, type) [Pi-T]
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ kindOf (T,K))⇒
kindOf (λx : t.T,Πx:t.K) [Abs-T]
typeOf (x, t) ∧ kindOf (t′,Πx:t.K)⇒ kindOf (t′ x,K) [App-T]
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X,T ))⇒
typeOf (λx : t.X,Πx:t.T ) [Abs-O]
typeOf (x, t) ∧ typeOf (y,Πx:t.T )⇒ typeOf (y x, T ) [App-O]
kindOf ((λx : t.T )x, k)⇒ (λx : t.T )x = T (β-T)
kindOf (λx : t.t′x, k)⇒ t′ = λx : t.t′x (η-T)
typeOf ((λx : t.X)x, t′)⇒ (λx : t.X)x = X (β-O)
typeOf (λx : t.y x, t′)⇒ y = λx : t.y x (η-O)
9 2006/7/28
Remarks: (1) As usual, we omit the signature consisting of type-
family- and object- constants of various kinds and types.
(2) Notice again how the process of instanciating generic/formal
parameters by concrete/actual parameters is handled. For instance,
in the axiom [App-O] above, y has a type T formally dependent
on x of type t, which means that when applied to an actual param-
eter of the required type, will yield something of type T with the
formal parameter replaced by the actual one also referred to as x,
but this time not covered by the Π-binding.
(3) Especially in intricate situations like this, where kinds, types,
and data are combined in various ways, we claim that a HORN2
denition of a calculus is more readable and intuitive than a type-
context-based one.
Type:Type λ-Calculus (TTλ). Unsorted. One relation, typeOf .
Term ::= Var | type | Term TermλVar : Term.Term | ΠVar : Term
x, t, t′, u range over variables, andX,T over terms. We write x,X
to refer what should be considered as data, t, t′, T when types are
meant, and u when the variable denotes either data or types. (These
conventions are taken only for readability.)
typeOf (type, type) [T:T]
typeOf (t, type) ∧ (∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ typeOf (T, type))
⇒ typeOf (Πu : t.T, type) [Π]
typeOf (Πu : t.T, type) ∧ (∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ typeOf (X,T ))⇒
typeOf (λu : t.X,Πu : t.T ) [Abs]
(typeOf (Πu : t.T, type) ∧ typeOf (x,Πu : t.T )
∧typeOf (u, t))⇒ typeOf (xu, T ) [App]
(∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ T = T ′)⇒ Πu : t.T = Πu : t.T ′ (ξΠ)
(∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ X = Y )⇒ λu : t.X = λu : t.Y (ξλ)
typeOf ((λu : t.X)u, t′)⇒ (λu : t.X)u = X (β)
typeOf (λu : t.x u, t′)⇒ x = λu : t.x u (η)
3.2 Recovering the Original Calculi
The above HORN2 specications of calculi state axioms with a
clear intuitive content. One can think of these axioms either seman-
tically, as properties of the desired GFOL models, or syntactically,
as constraints over the corresponding term syntax. But what is the
precise relationship between our HORN2 specications and the tra-
ditional denitions of these calculi? While intuitively the relation-
ship is very tight - they both follow the same intuitions about func-
tions, typing, subtyping, etc. - this is obviously not precise enough.
If we claim to have specied, or dened, for instance, System
F in HORN2, we should be able to show that, indeed, our speci-
cation conforms System F. In other denitional frameworks, this
is usually performed by a translation between the original system
and its specication, which then needs to be shown adequate. In
our case, it turns out that such a translation is not necessary, since
the Gentzen system K=E (see Section 2.6) associated to the HORN2
specication of the calculus has already done this.
For example, the next table lists all the instance rules given by
the axioms of the HORN2 specication SF of System F, i.e., all the
rules ofK=SF . For the sake of visual comparison with the traditional
System-F denition, we shall use, in an inx style, the symbol
: instead of typeOf . Recall that lower-case letters like t and
x, y denote type and data variables, and corresponding upper-case
letters denote type and data terms. (Appendix A further claries
why the system in the table below is indeed the Gentzen system
K=SF induced by the theory SF .)
·
Γ . x : T
if (x : T ) is in Γ [Axiom]
Γ (x :T ) . X : T
′
Γ . (λx :T.X) : T → T ′ [Inst-Abs]
Γ . X : T
Γ . (λt.X) : Πt.T
[Inst-T-Abs]
Γ . X : T → T ′ , Γ . Y : T
Γ . X Y : T
′ [Inst-App]
Γ . X : Πt.T
Γ . X T
′
: T [t← T ′] [Inst-T-App]
·
Γ . X = X
(Inst-Re)
Γ . X = Y
Γ . Y = X
(Inst-Symm)
Γ . X = Y , Γ . Y = Z
Γ . X = Z
(Inst-Trans)
·
Γ . T = T
(Inst-T-Re)
Γ . T = T
′
Γ . T
′
= T
(Inst-T-Symm)
Γ . T = T
′
, Γ . T
′
= T
′′
Γ . T = T
′′ (Inst-T-Trans)
Γ . X = Y , Γ . T = T
′
, Γ . X : T
Γ . Y : T
′ (Inst-Comp:)
Γ . X = Y
Γ . Z[z ← X] = Z[z ← Y ] (Inst-Subst)
Γ . T = T
′
Γ . T
′′
[t← T ] = T ′′[t← T ′] (Inst-T-Subst)
Γ (x : T ) . X = Y
Γ . λx : T.X = λx : T.Y
(Inst-ξ)
Γ . X = Y
Γ . λt.X = λt.Y
(Inst-T-ξ)
Γ . (λx : T.X)Y : T
′
Γ . (λx : T.X)Y = X[x← Y ] (Inst-β)
Γ . (λt.X)T : T
′
Γ . (λt.X)T = X[t← T ] (Inst-T-β)
Γ . (λy : T.Xy) : T
′
Γ . X = λy : T.Xy
(Inst-η)
Γ . (λt.Xt) : T
′
Γ . X = λt.Xt
(Inst-T-η)
The side conditions of the above HORN2-Gentzen-system rules
turn out to be the familiar ones: at [Inst-Abs] and (Inst-ξ), x does
not occur (free) in Γ; at [Inst-T-Abs] and (Inst-T-ξ), t does not
occur in Γ; at (Inst-η), y 6∈ FV(X); at (Inst-T-η), t 6∈ FV(X).
Note that the equality rules are duplicated (and labelled (Inst-Re),
(Inst-T-Re) etc.), since there are two sorts, data and type. We
obtained indeed the System-F's original calculus, modulo a few
minor adjustments discussed next.
If we pick any other specication from Section 3.1 and the
corresponding original calculus, we shall discover a similar situ-
ation as in the case of System F. The Gentzen system underlying a
HORN2 theory that denes a calculus coincides with the original-
calculus' denition, modulo the following three adjustments:
• Since we work in a logic with equality where relations such as
typing are implicitly compatible with equality, type preserva-
tion holds by default; therefore, elimination of the (Inst-Comp:)
rule above, i.e., a proof of type preservation, could be seen as
an optimization of the HORN2 Gentzen system. If one needs to
dene a calculus without type preservation, one clearly should
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not use HORN2 with equality, but could use HORN2 without
equality, treating = as an ordinary relation symbol.
• Because of the generality of the term syntax concept, one could
not possibly know at the HORN2 level how terms are actually
built, e.g., using operations such as the application. Therefore,
congruence rules like
Γ . X = Y , Γ . X
′
= Y
′
Γ . XX
′
= Y Y
′ [Cong]
are not available as tautological, i.e., built-in, rules in HORN2.
While such rules could indeed be enforced by axioms at the
specication level, they are not necessary however, since their
actual role would be to state compatibility with substitution, the
latter being built in HORN2 with equality - the (Inst-Subst) rule
above. In conclusion, the Gentzen system for the HORN2 the-
ory corresponds to a substitution-based (rather than operation-
congruence-based) version of the original calculus.5
• It is usually the case that some properties that are deducible
from the HORN2 denitions are not of much interest to the orig-
inal calculus; for example, in the HORN2 denition of System
F, one could state and prove that t = t for all types t. More-
over, due to the fact that here the antecedents Γ in sequents
Γ . d may contain not only trivial typings x : T , associating
data variables to type variables, but also more involved typ-
ings X : T and equalities X1 = X2 or T1 = T2, one could
also prove things like (T1 = T3) (T2 = T3) . (T2 = T3)
or (X : T ) (T = T1) (T1 = T2) . X : T2. Note, however,
that all these extra deducible properties are trivial  indeed,
one can easily see that any combination of the rules (Inst-T-
Re), (Inst-T-Symm), (Inst-T-Trans), and (Inst-T-Subst:) may
only entail trivial equalities between types. Moreover, this ex-
tra pseudo-information makes sense for the original calculus it-
self (and thus it is not junk), just that the calculus does not
bother to consider it - indeed, if one asks whether type equal-
ity is transitive or reexive, the answer should be positive. For
other calculi, such as the Type:Type λ-calculus and Edinburgh
LF (our theories TTλ and LF in Subsection 3.1) where one
needs to perform more involved deductions with types, the fact
that HORN2 allows by default in its sentences variables ranging
over all syntactic categories becomes convenient.
Therefore, a HORN2 specication E brings in fact a higher-level
notation for the calculus, because, by unfolding E into its afferent
Gentzen system K=E , one obtains the original calculus itself. Thus,
one can think of K=E as the traditional denition of the calculus.
However, K=E and E have precisely the same expressiveness only
if E is amenable (Theorem 4). If E is an extensional theory,
as for untyped λ-calculus, amenability and thus completeness of
K=E come for free (Corollary 1); but for proper HORN2 theories
one needs to prove amenability. Thus, amenability corresponds to
adequacy; note, however, a signicant shift of focus: one needs not
relate a HORN2 theory to the external original denition of a
calculus, as in the case of adequacy, but rather prove something
only about the theory, namely, that its Gentzen system G=E is closed
under the drop rules. Fortunately, like other proofs of drop-rule
closures in λ-calculi (see, e.g., [15]), such proofs tend to be routine.
PROPOSITION 6. All the theoriesE in Subsection 3.1 are amenable,
and thus K=E is complete for any of them.
We believe that any λ-calculus specication in HORN2, if stated
naturally, is amenable. Indeed, amenability means closure of G=E
5 Actually, most calculi denitions either use directly a substitution rule, or
prove it as a derived rule.
under the drop rules associated to the proper HORN2 axioms of the
specications. For any proper HORN2 axiom useful for dening
calculi that we can imagine, its condition-of-the-condition states
that a piece of data x is classied in a certain way, i.e., has a certain
type or kind T , and thus its associated drop rule states that the infor-
mation typeOf (x, T ) or kindOf (x, T ) with x completely fresh, i.e.,
completely unrelated to the context of the sequent, cannot help de-
duction. E.g., provided x is fresh for Γ and ∆, ΓtypeOf (x, T ) . ∆
is derivable only if Γ . ∆ is so. The information that something
(referred to as x) has a type T (i.e., T is inhabited by x), does not
reveal anything new in a context Γ . ∆ that is insensitive to that
something (i.e., that does not contain x).
4. Ad Hoc versus GFOL Models for λ-Calculi
GFOL provides models in a uniform manner to all its theories, in
particular to all those in Section 3.1. We claim that this general-
purpose GFOL semantics is as good/bad as domain-specic
semantics previously proposed for some of these calculi. Not only
it yields a notion of model for the particular calculus that makes
deduction complete, but this notion resembles closely the domain-
specic, ad hoc one. We exemplify this on untyped λ-calculus
and on System F. For the former, the GFOL semantics coincides
(up to a carrier-preserving bijection between classes of models)
with its ad hoc, set-theoretical semantics from [3]; for the latter,
GFOL provides a novel semantics, equivalent to the one given in
[5]. Here equivalence means the existence of a bijection between
elementary classes of models and will be brought by back and
forth mappings between the classes of models, which preserve and
reect satisfaction; an equivalence brings an isomorphism between
the skeletons of two logics [18] - this situation is similar to the one
of equivalence of categories [13].
4.1 Untyped λ-Calculus
The term syntax of Untyped Lambda Calculus (ULC) was already
mentioned in Section 3.1, for the specication Uλ. We let Λ (in-
stead of Term) denote the set of λ-terms over the countably in-
nite set Var of variables, modulo α-equivalence (we shall use
the same notations as in [3]). In order to ease the presentation,
we do not consider constants, but they could have been consid-
ered as well without any further difculties. (This will be true
for System F as well.) We recall from [3] some model-theoretic
notions developed around ULC. Let us call pre-structure a triple
(A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ(A)), where A is a set, 〈 〉 is a binary opera-
tion on A (i.e., (A, 〈 〉) is an applicative structure), and for each
T ∈ Λ(A), AT : AVar → A, where Λ(A) denotes the set of λ-
terms with constants in A, modulo α-equivalence.
Given an equation T1 = T2 with T1, T2 λ-terms, one denes
A |=λ T1 = T2 as usual, by interpreting T1 = T2 as being
implicitly universally quantied - that is, by AT1(ρ) = AT2(ρ)
for all ρ : Var → A. For pre-structures, we consider the following
properties (where a, b range over elements of A, x over variables,
T, T1, T2 over terms, ρ, ρ′ over valuations, i.e., elements of AVar):
(P1) Ax(ρ) = ρ(x);
(P2) AT1T2(ρ) = AT1(ρ)〈AT2(ρ)〉;
(P3) If ρFV(T )= ρ′FV(T ), then AT (ρ) = AT (ρ′);
(P4) If AT (ρ[x← a]) = AT ′(ρ[x← a]) for all a ∈ A, then
Aλx.T (ρ) = Aλx.T ′(ρ);
(P5) Aλx.T (ρ)〈a〉 = AT (ρ[x← a]);
(P6) If a〈c〉 = b〈c〉 for all c ∈ A, then a = b;
(P7) Aa(ρ) = a.
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We next simplify the pre-structures slightly, by removing their re-
dundant data given by parameterized terms. A simple pre-structure
is a triple (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ) which satises all properties of a
pre-structure, except (P7). Note that the difference between simple
pre-structures and pre-structures is that only terms in Λ, and not
in Λ(A), are considered. Hence the notion of satisfaction, dened
for pre-structures only w.r.t. equations involving terms in Λ, also
makes sense for simple pre-structures. We shall only be interested
in pre-structures verifying at least (P1)-(P4). In this case, simple
pre-structures and pre-structures are essentially identical:
LEMMA 3. The forgetful mapping (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ(A)) to (A,
〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ) is a bijection, preserving satisfaction and each
of the properties (P5),(P6), between pre-structures verifying (P1)-
(P4) and (P7) and simple pre-structures verifying (P1)-(P4).
This lemma allows us to work with the more amenable simple pre-
structures, which we henceforth call pre-structures, and forget
about the more complicated ones, as well as about property (P7).
A syntactical λ-model [3] (λ-model for short) is a pre-structure
verifying (P1)-(P5). A λ-model is extensional if it veries (P6).
We now come to the representation of ULC in HORN2. Con-
sider the generic rst-order language (Var,Λ, ∅), whose models
have therefore the form (A, (AT )T∈Λ). Rather than considering
only the HORN2 theory Uλ, we prefer to play around with more
combinations of HORN2 formulae (among which Uλ), in order to
allow a closer look at the relationship between the two types of
models. We shall work with the following HORN2 formulae and
schemes of formulae:6
(λx.T )T ′ = T [T ′/x] (β)
(λx.T )x = T (β′)
λx.T x = T, if x 6∈ FV(T ) (η)
λx.y x = y (η′)
(∀x.T1 = T2)⇒ λx.T1 = λx.T2 (ξ)
(∀x.T1 x = T2 x)⇒ T1 = T2, if x 6∈ FV(T ) (ext)
(∀x.y1x = y2x)⇒ y1 = y2 (ext′)
Note that we do not use the same notations as in Section 3.1. Uλ
here consists of (β′), (ξ), and (η′).
LEMMA 4. Each of the schemes of formulae (β), (η), (ext) is
semantically equivalent in GFOL to its primed variant.
This lemma points out that side-conditioned axiom schemes like
(η) and (ext) are not necessary in GFOL, since they are expressible
as single sentences, (η′) and (ext′).
We dene a correspondence between pre-structures verifying
(P1)-(P4) and GFOL models satisfying ξ as follows:
• Each pre-structure verifying (P1)-(P4)L = (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ)
is mapped to a GFOL model L# = (A, (AT )T∈Λ);
• Each GFOL model M = (A, (AT )T∈Λ) satisfying (ξ) is
mapped to a pre-structure M$ = (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ), where
〈 〉 is dened by a〈b〉 = Axy(ρ), with ρ taking x to a and y to
b.
PROPOSITION 7. The above two mappings are well dened and
mutually inverse. Moreover, they preserve satisfaction and they can
be restricted and corestricted to:
(a) λ-models versus GFOL models satisfying (ξ), (β) (i.e., models
of Uλ without (η));
(b) extensional λ-models versus GFOL models satisfying (ξ), (β), (η)
(i.e., models of Uλ).
6 Recall the conventions regarding axioms and axiom schemes.
Considering the above satisfaction-preserving bijections, one could
say that the syntactic models coincide with the GFOL models for
the corresponding theories.
4.2 System F
The syntactic categories of System F [8, 23] are dened in Section
3.1 (as the two-sorted term syntax of theory SF ). These coincide
with those of System F as dened in the literature, just that we
call data terms and type terms what are traditionally referred
to as terms and types. A typing context is a nite set {x1 :
T1, . . . , xn :Tn} where xi's are data variables, Ti's are type terms,
and no data variable appears twice. Below x, y andX,Y range over
data variables and terms, t, t′ and T, T ′ over type variables and
terms, and Γ over typing contexts. The typing system for System F
derives typing judgements, i.e., triples Γ . X : T , and is given by
the following rules:
·
Γ . x :T
if (x :T ) ∈ Γ [SF-InVar]
Γ (x :T ) . X : T ′
Γ . (λx :T.X) : T → T ′ [SF-Abs]
Γ . X : T
Γ . (λt.X) : Πt.T
[SF-T-Abs]
Γ . X : T → T ′ Γ . Y : T
Γ . X Y : T ′ [SF-App]
Γ . X : Πt.T
Γ . X T ′ : T [T ′/t] [SF-T-App]
At the rules [SF-AddVar] and [SF-Abs], Γ (x : T ) 7 is assumed to
be a typing context with (x :T ) 6∈ Γ, i.e., it is assumed that x is not
free in the left of any pair in Γ. At [SF-T-Abs], it is assumed that
t is not free in the right of any pair in Γ. We let `SF Γ . X : T
denote the fact that Γ . X : T is deducible in the above system.
We relate System F and the HORN2 theory SF rst w.r.t. typ-
ing. For each typing context Γ = {x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn}, we let Γ#
be the GFOL formula typeOf (x1, T1) ∧ . . . ∧ typeOf (xn, Tn).
PROPOSITION 8. For all typing judgements Γ . X : T ,
`SF Γ . X : T iff SF `GFOL ∀FV(X,T ).Γ# ⇒ typeOf(X,T ).
A Henkin model H for System F [5, 15] is a tuple
(T ,F ,→,Π, Itype, (Domτ )τ∈T , (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T , (Appf )f∈F , I),
together with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm, (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a)→: T × T → T ,
(b) Π : F → T ,
(c) F ⊆ T T ,
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) Appτ,σ : Domτ→σ → DomσDomτ for each τ, σ ∈ T ,
(f) Appf : DomΠf →
Q
τ∈T Domf(τ) for each f ∈ F ,
(g) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(h) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × (SDom)DVar : for all x : T ′ ∈
Γ, δ(x) ∈ DomHT ′ (γ)} →
SDom for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj
with `SF Γ . X : T , such that the following hold:
(1) Each of Appτ,σ and Appf is injective;
(2) (τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ])) ∈ F for each T, t, γ;
(3) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar;
(4) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(5) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(6) HΠt.T (γ) = Π(τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ]));
7 We keep a convention similar to the one of Section 2.5, that Γ (x :T ) is a
notation for Γ ∪ {(x :T )}.
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(7) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x);
(8) HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) =
AppHT ′ (γ),HT (γ)(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ))(HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(9) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) =
Appτ 7→HT ′ (γ[t←τ ])(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ))(HT (γ));
(10) HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ) ∈ DomHT (γ)→HT ′ (γ) and, for each
d ∈ DomHT (γ), AppHT (γ),HT ′ (γ)(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ))(d) =
HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(11) HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ) ∈
DomΠ(τ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])) and, for each τ ∈ T , Appτ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])
(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ))(τ) = HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
Above, Tj denotes the set of typing judgements and
SDom de-
notes
S
τ∈T Domf(τ); tj ranges over typing judgements, σ, τ and
d, d′ over elements of T and SDom, γ and δ over maps in T TVar
and (
SDom)DVar; τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ]) denotes the function map-
ping each τ to HT (γ[t ← τ ]). We use slightly different notations
than [15]; also, we include interpretations of types and well-typed
terms HT and Htj as part of the structure, while [15] equivalently
asks that such interpretations exist and then proves them unique.
Satisfaction by Henkin models H of well-typed equations
Γ . X = Y : T (with `SF Γ . X : T and `SF Γ . X : T )
is dened by H |=SF Γ . X = Y : T iff HΓ .X:T = HΓ .Y :T .
To avoid technical details irrelevant here, we assume non-
emptiness of types (without such an assumption, the Henkin mod-
els are not complete for System F, but only if one considers a richer
language - see [15]). Next we dene mappings between System-
F Henkin models and GFOL models for SF . Given three sets
A,B,C, a mapping f : A×B → C is called extensional if for all
a, a′ ∈ A, if f(a, b) = f(a′, b) for all b ∈ B then a = a′. Below,
the satisfaction relation for 1-,2-,3-,4-, and 5- Henkin models is
dened similarly to that for Henkin models.
The rst transformations are:
• Consider each Appτ,σ not as an injective mappingDomτ→σ →
DomσDomτ , but as an extensional mapping Domτ→σ ×
Domτ → Domσ;
• Consider each Appf not as an injective mapping DomΠf →Q
τ∈T Domf(τ), but as an extensional mapping DomΠf ×T → SDom such that for each (d, τ) ∈ DomΠf × T ,
Appf (d, τ) ∈ Domf(t);
• Assume F consists only of mappings of the form τ 7→
HT (γ[t← τ ]) for some T ∈ TTerm, t ∈ TVar and γ ∈ T TVar;
only this kind of mappings are used in the Henkin model de-
nition, and thus in the denition of satisfaction;
• Assume all Domτ and Domσ , with τ 6= σ, mutually disjoint;
this obviously does not affect the satisfaction relation.
We thus obtain the following equivalent models for System F:
A 1-Henkin model H is a a tuple
(T ,F ,→,Π, Itype, (Domτ )τ∈T , (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T , (Appf )f∈F , I),
together with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm, (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a)→: T × T → T ,
(b) Π : F → T ,
(c) F ⊆ T T , F = {τ 7→ HT (γ[t ← τ ]) : T ∈ TTerm, t ∈
TVar, γ ∈ T TVar},
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) Appτ,σ : Domτ→σ ×Domτ → Domσ for each τ, σ ∈ T ,
(f) Appf : DomΠf × T →
SDom for each f ∈ F ,
(g) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(h) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × (SDom)DVar : for all x : T ′ ∈
Γ, δ(x) ∈ DomHT ′ (γ)} →
SDom for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj
with `SF Γ . X : T ,
such that the following hold:
(1) Domτ ∩ Domσ = ∅ whenever τ 6= σ; dc ∈ DConst;
(2) Each of Appτ,σ and Appf is extensional, and Appf (d, τ) ∈
Domf(t) for all (d, τ) ∈ DomΠf × T ;
(3) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar;
(4) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(5) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(6) HΠt.T (γ) = Π(τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ]));
(7) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x)
(8) HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) =
AppHT ′ (γ),HT (γ)(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ), HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(9) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) =
Appτ 7→HT ′ (γ[t←τ ])(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ));
(10) HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ) ∈ DomHT (γ)→HT ′ (γ) and, for each
d ∈ DomHT (γ), AppHT (γ),HT ′ (γ)(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), d) =
HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(11) HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ) ∈ DomΠ(τ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])) and, for each
τ ∈ T , Appτ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ), τ) =
HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
LEMMA 5. Henkin and 1-Henkin models are equivalent, in that
there exists a satisfaction- preserving and reecting surjection &1
between the class of Henkin models and that of 1-Henkin models.
That is to say: for all Henkin models H and well-typed equation
Γ . X = Y : T ,
H |= Γ . X = Y : T iff H&1 |= Γ . X = Y : T.
For the next modication we do not introduce a new model name.
We simply assume that the 1-Henkin models have the mappings
Π and→ injective. It is conceptually straightforward that by taking
this assumption we obtain equivalent models. Indeed, any 1-Henkin
model H with non-injective Π and→ can be transformed, without
affecting the satisfaction relation, into one with injective Π and
→, by tagging the results of these mappings applications with the
arguments.
We next simplify the 1-Henkin models by getting rid of their
functional component F . We base this simplication on the fact
that, by the injectivity of Π, we can replace the index f of App with
HΠt.T (γ), where f ∈ F has the form τ 7→ HT (γ[τ ← t]).
A 2-Henkin model H is a a tuple
(T ,→, Itype, (Domτ )τ∈T , (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T , (Appτ )τ∈T , I), to-
gether with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm, (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a)→: T × T → T is an injective mapping,
(b) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(c) Appτ,σ : Domτ→σ ×Domτ → Domσ for each τ, σ ∈ T ,
(d) AppHΠt.T (γ) : DomHΠt.T (γ) ×T →
SDom for each γ, t, T ,
(e) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(f) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × (SDom)DVar : for all x : T ′ ∈
Γ, δ(x) ∈ DomHT ′ (γ)} →
SDom for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj
with `SF Γ . X : T ,
such that the following hold:
(1) Domτ ∩ Domσ = ∅ whenever τ 6= σ;
(2) Each of Appτ,σ and AppHΠt.T (γ) is extensional, and
AppHΠt.T (γ)(d, τ) ∈ DomHT (γ[t←τ ]) for each t, T, γ and (d, τ) ∈DomHΠt.T (γ) × T ;
(3) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar;
(4) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(5) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(6) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x)
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(7) HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) =
AppHT ′ (γ),HT (γ)(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ), HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(8) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) =
AppHΠt.T ′ (γ)(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ));
(9) HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ) ∈ DomHT (γ)→HT ′ (γ) and, for each
d ∈ DomHT (γ), AppHT (γ),HT ′ (γ)(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), d) =
HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(10) HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ) ∈ DomHΠt.T (γ) and, for each τ ∈ T ,
AppHΠt.T (γ)(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ), τ) = HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
LEMMA 6. 1-Henkin and 2-Henkin models are equivalent, in that
there exist two satisfaction- preserving and reecting mappings &12
and &21 between the two classes of models.
Next we atten the multi-typed domain Dom of 2-Henkin models.
The attening is based on the following:
• The multi-typing of Dom can be viewed as a relation typeOf
between data and types;
• Due to the type-wise disjointness of the domain and the in-
jectivity of →, the families of mappings (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T and
(Appτ )τ∈T can be replaced by two mappings App :
SDom×SDom → SDom and TApp : SDom × T → SDom,
with postulating the necessary typing restrictions; since App
and TApp will be total functions, we allow them to be applied
outside the areas designated (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T and (Appτ )τ∈T
too, but this does not affect the satisfaction relation.
A 3-Henkin model H is a a tuple (T ,D,→,App, TApp, Itype, I,
typeOf ) together with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm, (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a)→: T × T → T is an injective mapping,
(b) App : D ×D → D,
(c) TApp : D × T → D,
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) typeOf ⊆ D × T ,
(f) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(g) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × DDVar : for all x : T ′ ∈
Γ, typeOf (δ(x), HT ′(γ))} → D for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj
with `SF Γ . X : T ,
such that the following hold:
(1) {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, τ)} ∩ {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, σ)} = ∅ when-
ever τ 6= σ;
(2) For each τ, σ, d, d′, if typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ)
then typeOf (App(d, d′), σ);
(3) For each t, T, γ, τ, d, if typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ)) then
typeOf (TApp(d, τ), HT (γ[t← τ ]));
(4) For each τ, σ, App is (τ, σ)-extensional, i.e., for each d, d′
with typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ → σ), if App(d, d′′) =
App(d′, d′′) for all d′′ with typeOf (d′′, τ) then d = d′;
(5) For each T, t, γ, TApp is HΠt.T (γ)-extensional, i.e., for each
d, d′ with typeOf (d, τ) and typeOf (d′, τ), if TApp(d, σ) = TApp(d′, σ)
for all σ, then d = d′;
(6) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar;
(7) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(8) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(9) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x)
(10)HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) = App(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ), HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(11) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) = TApp(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ));
(12) typeOf (HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ)) and, for
each dwith typeOf (d, HT (γ)), App(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), d) =
HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(13) typeOf (HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ), HΠt.T (γ)) and, for each τ ∈ T ,
App(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ), τ) = HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
LEMMA 7. 2-Henkin and 3-Henkin models are equivalent, in that
there exist two satisfaction- preserving and reecting mappings &23
and &32 between the two classes of models.
We are now ready to eliminate typing judgements from the seman-
tics. The following lemma shows that typing judgements are se-
mantically redundant:
LEMMA 8. Let H be a 3-Henkin model, γ : TVar → T and
δ : DVar → D. Then there for any two pairs (Γ, T ) and (Γ′, T ′)
such that ` Γ . X : T and ` Γ′ . X : T ′ such that HΓ . X:T and
HΓ′ . X:T ′ are dened on (γ, δ), it holds that HΓ . X:T (γ, δ) =
HΓ′ . X:T ′(γ, δ).
Based on this lemma and on the fact that satisfaction is not affected
by allowing interpretations of data terms that cannot type, we
obtain some further equivalent models:
A 4-Henkin modelH is a a tuple (T ,D,→,App, TApp, Itype, I, typeOf )
together with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm, (HX)X∈DTerm), where:
(a)→: T × T → T is an injective mapping,
(b) App : D ×D → D,
(c) TApp : D × T → D,
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) typeOf ⊆ D × T ,
(f) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(g) HX : T TVar ×DDVar → D for each X ∈ DTerm,
such that the following hold:
(1) {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, τ)} ∩ {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, σ)} = ∅ when-
ever τ 6= σ;
(2) For each τ, σ, d, d′, if typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ),
then typeOf (App(d, d′), σ);
(3) For each t, T, γ, τ and d with typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ)), it holds
that typeOf (TApp(d, τ), HT (γ[t← τ ]));
(4) For each τ, σ, App is (τ, σ)-extensional, i.e., for each d, d′
with typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ → σ), if App(d, d′′) =
App(d′, d′′) for all d′′ with typeOf (d′′, τ) then d = d′;
(5) For each T, t, γ, TApp is HΠt.T (γ)-extensional, i.e., for each
d, d′ with typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ)) and typeOf (d′, τ), if TApp(d, σ) =
TApp(d′, σ) for all σ, then d = d′;
(6) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar;
(7) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(8) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(9) Hx(γ, δ) = δ(x)
(10) HXY (γ, δ) = App(HX(γ, δ), HY (γ, δ));
(11) HXT (γ, δ) = TApp(HΠt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ, δ));
(12) If typeOf (Hλx:T.X(γ, δ), HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ)) and
typeOf (d, HT (γ)), then App(Hλx:T.X(γ, δ), d) = HX(γ, δ[x←
d]);
(13) if typeOf (Hλt.X(γ, δ), HΠt.T (γ)) then App(Hλt.X(γ, δ), τ) =
HX(γ[t← τ ], δ).
In the denition of 4-Henkin models, HT has T TVar as its domain.
If we were to regard such models as two-sorted GFOL models, we
would need its domain to be T TVar × DDVar, just like the one of
HX . And indeedHT can be seen as a function on the latter domain,
constant in the second variable; this view of HT is consistent with
the properties of GFOL models, since HT should depend solely on
the free variables of T , and there are no data variables occurring in
a type term. Thus 4-Henkin models are immediately equivalent to
the following:
A 5-Henkin modelH is a a tuple (T ,D,→,App, TApp, Itype, I, typeOf )
together with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm, (HX)X∈DTerm), where:
(a)→: T × T → T is an injective mapping,
(b) App : D ×D → D,
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(c) TApp : D × T → D,
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) typeOf ⊆ D × T ,
(f) HT : T TVar ×DDVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(g) HX : T TVar ×DDVar → D for each X ∈ DTerm,
such that the following hold:
(1) {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, τ)} ∩ {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, σ)} = ∅ when-
ever τ 6= σ;
(2) For each τ, σ, d, d′, if typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ),
then typeOf (App(d, d′), σ);
(3) For each t, T, γ, τ, δ and d with typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ, δ)), it
holds that typeOf (TApp(d, τ), HT (γ[t← τ ], δ));
(4) For each τ, σ, App is (τ, σ)-extensional, i.e., for each d, d′
with typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ → σ), if App(d, d′′) =
App(d′, d′′) for all d′′ with typeOf (d′′, τ) then d = d′;
(5) For each T, t, γ, δ, TApp is HΠt.T (γ, δ)-extensional, i.e.,
for each d, d′ with typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ, δ)) and typeOf (d′, τ), if
TApp(d, σ) = TApp(d′, σ) for all σ, then d = d′;
(6) Ht(γ, δ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar;
(7) Htc(γ, δ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(8) HT→T ′(γ, δ) = HT (γ, δ)→ HT ′(γ, δ);
(9) Hx(γ, δ) = δ(x)
(10) HXY (γ, δ) = App(HX(γ, δ), HY (γ, δ));
(11) HXT (γ, δ) = TApp(HΠt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ, δ));
(12) If typeOf (Hλx:T.X(γ, δ), HT (γ, δ)→ HT ′(γ, δ)) and
typeOf (d, HT (γ, δ)), then App(Hλx:T.X(γ, δ), d) = HX(γ, δ[x←
d]);
(13) if typeOf (Hλt.X(γ, δ), HΠt.T (γ, δ)) then App(Hλt.X(γ, δ), τ) =
HX(γ[t← τ ], δ).
It should be clear that 5-Henkin models are essentially two-sorted
GFOL models satisfying SF , modulo a discussion similar to the
one we had on untyped λ-calculus. Note also that now we can
eliminate the disjointness assumption (1), as well as the injectivity
assumption about→, since these would not affect the satisfaction
of GFOL Horn clauses with conclusion referring to data, the only
ones that we are interested in. We have thus obtained that Henkin
models of System F are equivalent to the GFOL models of SF .
Henkin Models versus GFOL Models, Compactly. Above we
showed the relationship between the Henkin and GFOL seman-
tics for System F by describing a multi-step process that slowly
made us view a model of the former as a model of the later. While
such a presentation has the advantage that it provides a convinc-
ing argument for the equivalence of the two semantics (since each
of its steps was relatively simple), it might nevertheless lose sight
of the resulting correspondence between models. Next we provide
the direct version of the correspondence, together with the lemmas
asserting its correctness and together with a theorem stating rigor-
ously that the two semantics are equivalent (we state these results
without any proofs, as they just describe compactly the situation
presented and justied above).
Henkin to GFOL: For each Henkin model H , we dene a GFOL
model M = H# as follows:
(a) Mtype = T ;
(b) Mdata =
SDom;
(c) for each T ∈ TTerm, MT : Map(Var,M) → Mtype is the
mapping given by MT (γ, δ) = HT (γ) (recall that Map(Var,M)
denotes the set of two-sorted functions from Var = (TVar,DVar)
to M = (Mtype,Mdata));
(d) for each X ∈ DExp, MX : Map(Var,M) → Mdata is the
mapping given by: MX(γ, δ) = HΓ .X:T (γ, δ) if there exists Γ
and T such that `SF Γ . X : T and HΓ .X:T is dened on (γ, δ);
otherwise we take an arbitrary value in
SDom;
(e) (d, τ) ∈ BtypeOf iff d ∈ Domτ .
Roughly, H# is obtained from H by throwing types on the sort
type and all data of any type on sort data; the relation typeOf keeps
the connection between well-typed terms and types as in H . H#
may also contain some additional junk, of typeless (error) data.
LEMMA 9. The mappings MX above are well-dened for all X ∈
DExp. More specically, for each γ, δ, HΓ .X:T (γ, δ) does not
depend on the choice of Γ and T , so long as `SF Γ . X : T
and HΓ .X:T is dened on (γ, δ). Moreover, M is indeed a GFOL
model and M |=GFOL SF .
GFOL to Henkin: For each GFOL model M satisfying SF , we
dene a Henkin model H = M$ as follows:
(a) T = Mtype;
(b) F = {τ 7→MT (γ[t← τ ], δ) : γ, δ, T arbitrary};
(c) τ → σ = Mt→t′(γ, δ), where γ(t) = τ , γ(t′) = σ;
(d) ∀(f) = M(∀t)T (γ, δ), if f is τ 7→MT (γ[t← τ ], δ);
(e) Itype(tc) = Mtc(γ, δ) for some arbitrary (γ, δ);
(f) Domτ = {d ∈Mdata : (d, τ) ∈MtypeOf};
(g) Appτ,σ(d)(d′) = Mx y(γ, δ), where δ(x) = d, δ(y) = d′;
(h) Appf (d)(τ) = Mx t(γ, δ) where γ(t) = τ and δ(x) = d;
(i) I(dc) = Mdc(γ, δ) for some arbitrary (γ, δ);
(j) HT (γ) = MT (γ, δ) for some arbitrary δ;
(k)HΓ .X:T (γ, δ) = MX(γ, δ). Roughly,M$ classies the well-
typed data, on types, according to the typeOf relation in M .
LEMMA 10. All the above mappings are well-dened, i.e.:
- Mt→t′(γ, δ) does not depend on the choice of γ, δ, so long as
γ(t) = τ , γ(t′) = σ;
- if for some T, T ′, t, t′, γ, γ′, δ, δ′, the mappings τ 7→MT (γ[t←
τ ], δ) and τ 7→ MT ′(γ[t ← σ], δ) coincide, then M(∀t)T (γ, δ) =
M(∀t′)T ′(γ
′, δ′);
- Mtc(γ, δ) and Mtc(γ, δ) do not depend on the choice of γ, δ;
- Mx y(γ, δ) does not depend on the choice of γ, δ, so long as
δ(x) = d, δ(y) = d′; and if (d, τ → σ), (d′, τ) ∈ MtypeOf, then
(Mx y(γ, δ), σ) ∈MtypeOf;
- MT (γ, δ) does not depend on the choice of δ.
Moreover, H dened above is indeed a Henkin model.
Note that the mappings $ and # are actually the compositions of
all the intermediate mappings between the different versions of
Henkin models discussed above.
PROPOSITION 9. Assume `SF Γ . X : T and `SF Γ . Y : T .
Then:
(1) H |=SF Γ . X = Y : T iff H# |=GFOL Γ# ⇒ X = Y ;
(2) M |=GFOL Γ# ⇒ X = Y iff M$ |=SF Γ . X = Y : T .
Summing up the situation described by Propositions 8 and 9:
1. The well-typed System-F terms are precisely the ones that de-
note typed data (i.e., data items d such that there exists a type τ
with typeOf (d, τ)) in all models of SF ;
2. Henkin models correspond to models of SF , and vice versa;
3. A well-typed System-F equation is represented by a conditional
equation in GFOL;
4. A well-typed equation is satised by a Henkin model iff it is
satised by its corresponding model of SF , and vice versa.
5. Related Work
To properly distinguish GFOL from other approaches, a discussion
on encodings of formal systems is appropriate. Consider a formal
system, consisting of a syntax and deduction rules, say λ-calculus,
denoted Λ. One can formally mimic the informal denition of Λ
inside an axiomatic set theory, say ZF, by setting ZF-formulae
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var(x), term(x) and eq(x, y), which say x is a (λ-calculus) vari-
able, x is a term, and x, y are terms and their equality is de-
ducible in Λ, etc. Then any proof about Λ, including proofs that
certain facts are deducible in Λ, can be carried on inside ZF. How-
ever, as far as the original system Λ is concerned, this ZF de-
nition of Λ is not a denition, but an encoding; and to make the
encoding rigorous, one should give a mapping from terms in Λ to
their ZF representations.
Assume that the language of ZF has included, via a pro-
cess of Skolemization, the constants 0, succ, app, and lam, to-
gether with axioms stating their desired meaning: succ is the
successor function on natural numbers, app is the function
that takes terms t1, t2 to t1t2, etc.; also, assume that, both
in Λ and in ZF, one uses natural numbers as λ-calculus vari-
ables. The encoding Enc : Λ-terms → ZF -terms can be de-
ned by Enc(n) = succ . . . . . . succ(0) (n times), Enc(t1t2) =
app(Enc(t1),Enc(t2)), Enc(λn.t) = lam(Enc(n),Enc(t)). The
encoding is faithful: for λ-terms t1, t2, `Λ t1 = t2 iff ZF `
Enc(t1) = Enc(t2). Thus ZF can be used as a device to prove
equalities in Λ. Yet, ZF does not generalize Λ, nor is Λ a ZF theory
or anything similar. Λ was only encoded in ZF, so ZF regards it as
an object about which it can reason.
What an encoding of a formal system cannot provide is a mean-
ingful model-theoretic semantics for that system, because the en-
coding was only concerned with representing syntax and deduction.
Indeed, given a presumptive model of ZF,8 one cannot claim that it
provides a model for the λ-calculus. A ZF model would merely
provide a universe where the set of Λ-terms and the Λ deductive
system would dwell. It is true that any faithful encoding translates
whatever complete models the meta-theory (here ZF) has into mod-
els of the object-theory (here Λ); e.g., by the completeness of FOL
where ZF is a theory, `Λ t1 = t2 iff M |= Enc(t1) = Enc(t2) for
all modelsM of ZF. But such a semantics would clearly be unac-
ceptable for Λ, as a ZF model contains representations of λ-terms,
deduction rules, proofs, and the whole syntactic infrastructure of
Λ; moreover, this semantics is complete not because Λ equalities
are stating facts about these models, as would be desirable with a
semantics, but simply because the ZF models contain structure that
mimics Λ deductions.
The point of this discussion is independent of Λ and ZF; it
applies to any encoding. In particular, whenever one uses a xed
calculus or logic, such as HOL, to encode any other calculi, one
cannot claim to provide models for them. Thus, e.g., the fact that
HOL admits complete Henkin models and also can encode virtually
any formal system, does not mean that its Henkin models work as
a uniform semantics for these systems.
HORN2 (and thus GFOL) relates to its dened calculi not via
syntactic encodings, but via meaningful semantic interpretations. It
does not regard the desired calculus as a formal system that needs
to be somehow encoded; for instance, it does not make any attempt
to encode the structure of typing environments as such, but rather
regards them as syntactic counterparts of a higher-level semantic
intuition, just like, e.g., any FOL deductive system with all its
awkward side-conditions can be seen as a reection of a meaningful
FOL model theory. Some of the related works that we discuss next
fall in the category of encodings.
Higher-Order Abstract Syntax (HOAS). In HOAS [19, 11], one
uses a xed λ-calculus, the meta-calculus, to encode various other
formal systems, such as calculi or deductive systems of logics - let
us refer to these as object systems. All the syntactic categories of
an object system (terms, formulae, proofs, evaluation relations) be-
8 The fact that ZF cannot be proven to have models is irrelevant for this
discussion - we could have chosen weaker systems instead.
come terms in the meta-calculus. Object-system bindings are repre-
sented by λ-bindings in the meta-calculus. In particular, quite dif-
ferent binding operators in the object system (such as λ-abstraction
and universal quantication) are represented uniformly, using a sin-
gle binding operator  the meta-level λ-abstraction. Consequently,
all object-calculus axiom schemes become simple axioms in the
meta-calculus, their schematic aspect being handled by a a built-
in meta-calculus scheme, which does not appear in the specica-
tion itself. (To the contrary, GFOL specications need to use ax-
iom schemes in order to capture directly the axiom schemes of the
dened calculus - see Appendix A.) HOAS' syntactically uniform
representation, though very useful for proof-theoretic aspects, can-
not be sensitive to the model-theoretic aspects of the object sys-
tem. In particular, some presumptive models of the meta-calculus
do not provide models for the object calculus; and indeed, HOAS
does not attempt to provide such models, being concerned mainly
with proof-theoretic adequacy. Take for instance a representation
of λ-calculus in Edinburgh LF - such a representation would de-
ne the type of terms, that of equations, and the dependent types
of proofs. Thus a presumptive model of this theory (consisting here
only of constant declarations) stated in the dependent-type calculus
of LF, would be dwelled by elements called terms, equations, and
proofs, hence it would be far from being an appropriate model of
λ-calculus; the latter should surely not provide any interpretations
for proofs as elements in the model (though, as argued in [2], an LF
representation, if chosen in a denotational manner, could suggest
a model).
In conclusion, unlike GFOL, HOAS falls into the encoding-
based approaches, even though the encoded object has an extra
afnity with its encoding, as they share the same bindings. On
the more operational side, one can dene any meta-calculi used
in HOAS (such as untyped λ-calculus and the Edinburgh LF λ-
calculus with dependent types) as HORN2 theories and then use
these theories to represent object systems the same way the original
calculi do, but this would not be a proper use of HORN2 - as men-
tioned, its technique for dening calculi is different from HOAS.
Also, a framework such as LF could easily encode any instance of
GFOL and its theories (pretty much like it encodes FOL), whenever
the underlying term syntax is encodable.
Nominal Logic (NL) [21] is a rst-order logic that deals with ab-
stract syntax by means of names, which can be bound in terms just
like λ-calculus variables, but they are not variables; names are se-
mantical entities, having syntax-independent meaning and being
addressed explicitly by the freshness relation and the swapping op-
erator. GFOL resembles NL in that both are parameterized by a
notion of a term (substitution-based for GFOL, binding-based for
NL) and both are rst-order. However, GFOL differs from NL in
several aspects: (1) The NL approach to calculi denitions is even
more encoding-based than HOAS, as it explicitly denes substi-
tution and freshness inside its theories. (2) The NL models con-
tain semantic support for substitution, in its more amenable form
of swapping/permutation of names; GFOL models are required to
interpret syntax in a way that is substitution-consistent, but not to
interpret substitution as such. (3) NL is not a complete logic, due
to the second-order nature of the restrictions on its models.
Explicitly Closed Families and Binding Algebras. Structures con-
sisting of explicitly closed families and functionals (ECFF) were
introduced in [1] and studied as binding algebras in [25]. An ECFF
consists of a set A together with a family of operations on A and a
family of functionals (mappings between functions), such that the
set of functions on A is closed under the functional-based polyno-
mial combinators. The notion of term in this frameworks forms a
term syntax in our sense, and ECFFs are particular cases of models
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in our sense. However, ECFF have a more restricted use than our
GFOL models, since they make the commitment that bindings al-
ways dene functions. To the contrary, the interpretation of terms in
GFOL models has a loose character; it does not make any commit-
ment other than what is prescribed by the axioms of the theories.
As a consequence, calculi involving types of bindings other than
functional nd a direct representation in GFOL, while in ECFF
they could only hope for a functional encoding.
Substitution Algebras [6] treat substitution abstractly like we do,
but require models to account for substitution in a direct way.
Therefore they need to work in a presheaf topos different from Set
as the underlying universe, in order for elements in models to be
families of items, sensitive to the change of context/environment.
(Thus they propose a solution for semantic substitution different
than Nominal Logic.) While substitution algebras are related to
our term syntaxes, models differ in that we do not require them
to have built-in abstract syntax on their carrier sets, but rather
to be able to provide interpretations for all syntactic features. As
opposed to substitution algebras, HORN2 is directly applicable
to typed calculi, with typing judgements that change the typing
context being captured by HORN2 formulae.
6. Concluding remarks
We dened a generic rst-order logic, GFOL, in which terms are
axiomatized by common properties of their free variables and sub-
stitution, together with a complete deduction system. A fragment
of GFOL with sentences more general than Horn, called HORN2,
was shown to admit a more effective complete Gentzen system.
Several λ-calculi were dened as theories in HORN2, following a
higher-level view that allows one to focus on the specic aspects
of the calculus rather than on syntactic or tautological details. This
higher-level view brings a complete semantics to the specied cal-
culi in a natural, meaningful, and uniform way.
The kind of semantics that a calculus receives via GFOL is usu-
ally called loose, or logical semantics. This means that a calculus
does not receive a denotation in a xed model, but is rather regarded
as stating axioms about a whole class of models, just like group the-
ory states axioms that are to hold in a class of models called groups.
Completeness of a loose semantics means that a statement in the
language of the calculus is derivable in the calculus iff it is true in
all models. Thus one might be tempted to say that loose models
capture faithfully what the calculus can prove. However, a loose
semantics, while convenient for many purposes, is by no means the
end of the semantic story of the calculus, as sometimes a calculus
hides inside more than its deductive system can prove - hence the
need for a denotation that would provide further insight into what
the calculus actually means, in particular would discover desired
properties that were implicit in the calculus in a way more subtle
than by bare deduction consequence.
Regarding a presumptive denotational-semantics methodology
developed on top of HORN2, this was not the concern of the present
paper, but seems like a promising subject for future research. The
key to this would be the study of appropriate free and initial mod-
els for certain HORN2 theories - these models would constitute the
desired denotation in a similar style with initial models constitut-
ing the desired denotation for a rst-order data-type specica-
tion. For example, extensional theories can be shown to admit free
models, as well as initial reachable models, along the lines of the
interesting results from [16]. To faithfully capture higher-order de-
notations, partiality might be necessary as a rst-class citizen in the
models, via incomplete interpretations of terms into models.
Finally, it would be challenging to also study computational,
i.e., operational, aspects that could be extracted from the HORN2
theories: can equations and some relations such as typeOf or more-
General be executed, e.g., via rewriting or some form of general-
purpose logic programming technique, and thus obtain a calculus-
independent operational semantics methodology?
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A. The Use of Axiom Schemes
Due to the presence of binding, stating properties such as the β-
reduction amounts to giving an innite number of axioms that fol-
low a certain pattern, i.e., to providing an axiom scheme. This sit-
uation, present in all lambda calculi, persists in HORN2 theories
as well. While the use of axiom schemes (and therefore of innite
recursive axiomatizations rather than nite ones) is indeed a draw-
back, we consider that this is the necessary side-effect of the direct
way in which HORN2 approaches the denitions of calculi - not
by encoding as in HOAS, but by instanciating directly to the de-
sired calculus. In this sense, HORN2 is not a logical framework
for calculi denitions (as Edinburgh LF is), but rather a generaliza-
tion for all these calculi (according to Section 3). Moreover, axiom
schemes, so long as they rely on side-condition-free term patterns
like all the axiom schemes of HORN2 specications tend to do, are
not really a burden for deduction, as we argue below.
Indeed, the HORN2- Gentzen systems discussed in Section 2.6
use axiom instances obtained from the axioms by substituting
variables for terms. Now consider a term-pattern axiom scheme
such as (T-β) for the System-F specication SF in Section 3:
typeOf (λt.X, t′) ⇒ (λt.X)t = X , where t, t′ denote type vari-
ables and X an arbitrary data term (recall that the axiom is implic-
itly universally quantied over all its free variables). For using it
inside the HORN2 Gentzen system, one proceeds as follows: rst
one picks a term X , obtaining an instance of the axiom scheme;
then one substitutes by terms all the free variables in this instance;
nally, one places the substituted instance in an appropriate con-
text in the sequents appearing in deduction rules. Note that, ac-
cording to the above recipe, one needs to instanciate the axiom
scheme twice: rst by replacing the term metavariable X with an
actual term, and then by substituting the resulted free variables with
terms. However, following the usual practice of λ-calculi that do
not discriminate term metavariables over variable metavariables,
we can collapse these two instanciations into one, building on the
intuitively clear (and easily checkable) fact that after replacing
a term meta-variable such as X with an actual term, we do not
need to further substitute the free variables of this term, as we
can take the already substituted term directly. For example, in the
HORN2 Gentzen system K=SF for amenable theories, (T-β) yields
the following deduction rule, where T, T ′ stand for an arbitrary
type terms:
Γ . typeOf (λt.X, T ′)
Γ . (λt.X)T = X[T/t]
(Inst-T-β)
t above is substituted by T in the right of the succedent of the lower
sequent only, since all the other occurrences of t are term-bound.
We obtained the familiar (β)-rule for types. When transforming the
axioms into their associated instance rules, side conditions may
arise, as shown by the instance of SF 's [Abs]:
Γ typeOf (x, T ) . typeOf (X,T ′)
Γ . typeOf (λx :T.X, T → T ′) [Inst-Abs]
where x should be a data variable fresh w.r.t. Γ. Again we obtain the
familiar typing rule for abstraction, with the familiar side-condition
that x not be in Γ.
B. The Typing Relations
In the specications of Section 3, typing was dened by means of
a relation typeOf between the universe of data and the universe of
types. We also spoke about data terms and type terms. This ap-
proach may look non-standard to the readers used to view types as
items that are assigned to terms, at parsing or type-checking time,
and not to data. We explain it next. Our specication methodology
considers types, just like data, to be semantic items, populating the
models. In this view, it is not the case that terms have types, but
data items have types - and while inferring types for various data
in all models one indeed uses terms (data terms and type terms), in
a process that looks just like the traditional one of assigning types
to terms. The one who wishes to regard typing purely syntactically
can dene the syntactic typing relation between terms (i.e., in
our terminology, data terms) and types (i.e., type terms) as the fol-
lowing meta-relation: X has type T in the environment Γ iff the
theory infers Γ . X : T , i.e., if Γ . X : T is a tautological sequent
w.r.t. the theory - this relation is indeed the expected least relation
closed under some rules. But again, we regard typing judgements,
just like the inferred equality between terms, loosely, as sentences
that hold in all models. Just as much as we do not need (and makes
no sense) to state in the theory that the equality relation is the least
one closed under some rules, there is no need to make such meta-
statements about typing either, since they hold by the very nature
of deduction in any Gentzen system.
C. Sorts versus Types
HORN2 is a many-sorted logic, i.e., has a many-sorted variant.
When instanciating it to λ-calculi, depending on the complexity of
the calculus and sometimes on mere taste, one may choose between
two alternatives:
• To represent the types in the calculus as HORN2 sorts. This way,
typing is regarded syntactically, as a parsing, and thus meta-
level, issue of HORN2.
• To view types semantically, as inhabitants of some universe
of types, and dene the typing relation within the logic. This
way, sorts are reserved for more general classications of the
semantic items, e.g. into data and types.
The second approach has the advantage of being more exible,
and thus covers the cases of more complex calculi with non-trivial
typing and with higher-level classiers such as kinds. We have
pursued this approach in our specications from Section 3. On
the other hand, when possible, the rst approach simplies the
structure of the formulae, since well-typed-ness need not be stated
as an extra condition - indeed, extensional theories seem to sufce
here, bringing, via Corollary 1, faithfulness of the representation
for free, i.e., without the need to prove closure under the drop rules.
We exemplify this rst approach on an innitely-sorted HORN2
denition of simply-typed λ-calculus, alternative to Tλ of Section
3.
(Simply-)Typed λ-Calculus - Second Version (TλII)
Let B be a set, of basic types.
• The sorts are Sort ::= B | Sort → Sort - let us call the sorts
types
• Recall that for each t, t′ ∈ Sort, Vart ∩ Vart′ = ∅
• For each t, t′ ∈ Sort and b ∈ B,
Termb ::= Varb | Termt→bTermt
Termt→t′ ::= Vart→t′ | Termt′′→(t→t′)Termt′′ | λVart.Termt′
• No relation symbol (except equality)
We let t, t′, s range over types, xt, yt range over variables of type t,
andXt, Yt range over terms of type t - note that here term means
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well-typed term. The theory is given below:
(∀xt.Xs = Ys)⇒ λxt.Xs = λxt.Ys (ξ)
(λxt.Xs)xt = Xs (β)
xt→t′ = λyt.xt→t′ yt (η)
The Gentzen system K=TλII induced by this extensional theory is
the following:
·
Xt = Xt
(Inst-Re)
Xt = Yt
Yt = Xt
(Inst-Symm)
Xt = Yt , Yt = Zt
Xt = Zt
(Inst-Trans)
Xt = Yt
Zs[zt ← Xt] = Zs[zt ← Yt] (Inst-Subst)
Xs = Ys
λxt.Xs = λxt.Ys
(Inst-ξ)
·
(λxt.Xs)Yt = Xs[xt ← Yt] (Inst-β)
·
Xt→s = λyt.Xt→syt (Inst-η)
The above low-level implementation of TλII is, modulo a re-
placement of the congruence rules with a substitution rule, the
typed λ-calculus itself. And its completeness holds immediately by
Corollary 1, since TλII is an extensional theory. To the contrary,
the previous Gentzen system for the theory Tλ needs a little work
to be shown complete.
It is worth mentioning that the GFOL models of TλII are
precisely the Henkin models, also called frame models, of simply-
typed λ-calculus (see [15]).
D. Meta-Reasoning and Inductive Reasoning
Meta-reasoning about a calculus is not possible in its HORN2 spec-
ication just as much as it is not possible in the calculus itself.
Indeed, as already discussed, a HORN2 becomes the specied cal-
culus. In particular, one cannot show in HORN2 that a calculus is
conuent or terminating when equations are regarded as rewrite
rules, neither that a programming language is deterministic. Even
apart from their meta-theoretic aspect, these properties cannot be
captured in an axiomatic approach like ours, where evaluation of
a program to a value is only implicit in the deductive system, and
not explicit as in an SOS or other forms of operational semantics.
Even if meta-reasoning is not available in the HORN2 specica-
tions (and is not meant to be), desired induction principles may be
stated as sentences in an innitary version of GFOL. For instance,
here is how structural induction would look for the theory Uλ of
Section 3 (that species untyped λ-calculus):
((
V
X∈Term ∀FV(X) \ {x}.(∀x.ϕ(X))⇒ ϕ(λx.X))∧
(∀x, y.ϕ(x) ∧ ϕ(y)⇒ ϕ(x y)))⇒ ∀x.ϕ(x) (Ind)
Above, ϕ is an arbitrary GFOL formula with a pointed free vari-
able. Note that this innitary axiom is more manageable than it
looks. It says that if one is able to prove (∀x.ϕ(X)) ⇒ ϕ(λx.X)
for an arbitrary termX and also to prove ϕ(x)∧ϕ(y)⇒ ϕ(x y)),
then one can infer ∀x.ϕ(x).
Finally, desired existential properties, most notably existence
of xed points, are expressible and potentially provable in GFOL.
For instance, a consequence in GFOL of Uλ is: ∀x.∃y.x y = y,
meaning that every item has, regarded as a function, a xed point.
Existence of programs performing desired tasks (i.e., conforming
certain specications stated as formulae) may also be expressed
and proved directly in GFOL - a handy example is the existence
of xpoint operators: ∃y.∀x.x y x = y x, a stronger version of the
existence of xed points.
E. Proofs
Here we give proofs or proof sketches for the results stated in the
paper.
PROPOSITION 1. The following hold:
(1) x 6∈ FV(T ) implies T [T ′/x] = T ;
(2) y[T/x] = T if y = x and y[T/x] = y otherwise;
(3) FV(T [T ′/x]) = FV(T ) \ {x} ∪ FV(T ′);
(4) T [y/x][z/y] = T [z/x] if y 6∈ FV(T );
(5) T [y/x][x/y] = T if y 6∈ FV(T ).
Proof: We shall tacitly use properties (1)-(6) in Denition 1.
(1) Assume x 6∈ FV(T ). Since [T ′/x] FV(T )= 1Var FV(T ), we
obtain T [T ′/x] = Subst(T, 1Var) = T .
(2) If y = x then y[T/x] = Subst(x, [T/x]) = [T/x](x) =
T . If y 6= x then [T/x]FV(y)= 1VarFV(y), thus y[T/x] =
Subst(y, 1Var) = y.
(3) FV(T [T ′/x]) = FV(Subst(T, [T ′/x])) =S{FV([T ′/x](y)) : y ∈ FV(T )} =S{FV([T ′/x](x)) : x ∈ FV(T )} ∪ S{FV([T ′/x](y)) : y ∈
FV(T ), y 6= x} = FV(T ′) ∪ (FV(T ) \ {x}).
Above, we also applied point (2) of the current proposition.
(4) We have that T [y/x][z/y] = Subst(Subst(T, [y/x]), [z/y]) =
Subst(T, [y/x]; [z/y]). Now, for each u ∈ Var, we have that:
([y/x]; [z/y])(u) = Subst([y/x](u), [z/y]) =
=

Subst(y, [z/y]) , if u = x
Subst(u, [z/y]) , if u 6= x =
=
8<: z, if u = xz, if u 6= x and u = yu, if u 6= x and u 6= y =
=

z, if u = x or u = y
u, if u 6= x and u 6= y
Hence, since y 6∈ FV(T ), it follows that [y/x][z/y] FV(T )=
[z/x]FV(T ), implying Subst(T, [y/x]; [z/y]) = Subst(T, [z/x]).
(5) It follows by point (4), since Subst(T, [x/x]) = T . 
PROPOSITION 2. The following hold:
(1) If ρFV(ϕ)= ρ′FV(ϕ), then ρ ∈ Aϕ iff ρ′ ∈ Aϕ;
(2) ρ ∈ ASubst(ϕ, θ) iff Aθ(ρ) ∈ Aϕ;
(3) ϕ ≡α ψ implies Aϕ = Aψ;
(4) ϕ ≡α ψ implies FV(ϕ) = FV(ψ);
(5) ≡α is an equivalence;
(6) ϕ ≡α Subst(ϕ, 1Var);
(7) y 6∈ FV(ϕ) implies ϕ[y/x][z/y] ≡α ϕ[z/x];
(8) x 6∈ FV(ϕ) implies ϕ[T/x] ≡α ϕ;
(9) ϕ ≡α ψ implies Subst(ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(ψ, θ);
(10) θFV(ϕ)= θ′FV(ϕ) implies Subst(ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(ϕ, θ′);
(11) Subst(ϕ, θ; θ′) ≡α Subst(Subst(ϕ, θ), θ′);
(12) ϕ ≡α ϕ′ and ψ ≡α ψ′ implies: ¬ϕ ≡α ¬ϕ′, ϕ∧ψ ≡α
ϕ′ ∧ ψ′, ϕ⇒ ψ ≡α ϕ′ ⇒ ψ′, ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀x.ϕ′.
Proof: We shall tacitly use properties (1)-(6) in the denition of a
term syntax and properties (c).(i-iii) in the denition of models. All
proofs, except the one of point (12), will be performed by induction
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either on the structure of formulae, or on the structure of≡α; (IH)
will stand for the Induction Hypothesis. Each time, we shall skip
the case of logical connectors ¬,∧,⇒, since the induction step is
trivial for them.
We prove (1) and (2) by induction on the structure of ϕ.
(1) Base case. ρFV(T1,...,Tn)= ρ′FV(T1,...,Tn) implies
ρTi= ρ′Ti for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which implies
ATi(ρ) = ATi(ρ
′) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which implies that
ρ ∈ Aϕ iff ρ′ ∈ Aϕ.
Induction step. Assume ρFV(∀x.ϕ)= ρ′FV(∀x.ϕ). Then
ρFV(ϕ)\{x}= ρ′FV(ϕ)\{x}, hence for all a ∈ A, ρ[x← a]FV(ϕ)=
ρ′[x← a] FV(ϕ). By (IH), we get that for all a ∈ A, ρ[x ←
a] ∈ Aϕ iff ρ′[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ, in particular that ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ iff
ρ′ ∈ A∀x.ϕ.
(2) Base case. We have the following equivalencies:
ρ ∈ ASubst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn), θ) iff
ρ ∈ Api(Subst(T1, θ),...,Subst(Tn, θ)) iff
(ASubst(T1, θ)(ρ), . . . , ASubst(Tn, θ)(ρ)) ∈ Api iff
(AT1(Aθ(ρ)), . . . , ATn(Aθ(ρ))) ∈ Api iff
Aθ(ρ) ∈ Api(T1,...,Tn).
Induction step. We have the following equivalencies:
ρ ∈ Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) iff
ρ ∈ A∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) (where z is the least variable not in
FV(ϕ) ∪S{θ(y) : y ∈ FV(ϕ)})9 iff
ρ[z ← a] ∈ ASubst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) for all a ∈ A, iff (by (IH))
Aθ[x←z](ρ[z ← a]) ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff (as will be proved
shortly)
Aθ(ρ)[x← a] ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff
Aθ(ρ) ∈ A∀x.ϕ.
It remains to prove the promised equivalence. For it, it would
sufce that Aθ[x←z](ρ[z ← a])FV(ϕ)= Aθ(ρ)[x← a]FV(ϕ). To
prove the latter, let y ∈ FV(ϕ). Then
Aθ[x←z](ρ[x← a])(y) = Aθ[x←z](y)(ρ[x← a]) =
=

Aθ(y)(ρ[z ← a]), if x 6= y
Az(ρ[z ← a]), if x = y =
=

Aθ(y)(ρ[z ← a]), if x 6= y
a, if x = y.
On the other hand,
Aθ(ρ)[x← a](y) =

Aθ(y)(ρ), if x 6= y
a, if x = y.
Finally, we need to argue that ρ[z ← a]FV(θ(y))= ρFV(θ(y)) - this
is true because, by the choice of z, z 6∈ FV(θ(y)).
Points (3)-(11) will be proved by induction on the structure of
≡α.
(3): Base case. Obvious, since here ≡α coincides with equality.
Induction step. Assume ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀y.ψ. Then ϕ[z/x] ≡α
ψ[z/y] for some z 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ). We have the following
equivalencies:
ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ iff
ρ[x← a] ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff (as will be proved shortly)
A[z/x](ρ[z ← a]) ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff (by point (2))
ρ[z ← a] ∈ Aϕ[z/x] for all a ∈ A, iff (by (IH))
ρ[z ← a] ∈ Aψ[z/x] for all a ∈ A, iff
ρ ∈ A∀x.ψ .
It remains to prove the promised equivalence. According to
point (1), it would sufce that ρ[x← a]FV(ϕ)= A[z/x](ρ[z ← a])FV(ϕ).
9 From now on, whenever we need to consider such a variable z, we just
render it as the variable from the denition of substitution.
To prove the latter, let y ∈ FV(ϕ). Then
ρ[x← a](y) =
a, if y = x
ρ(y), if y 6= x.
On the other hand,
A[z/x](ρ[z ← a])(y) = A[z/x](y)(ρ[z ← a]) =
=

Az(ρ[z ← a]), if y = x
Ay(ρ[z ← a]), if y 6= x =
=

a, if y = x
ρ[z ← a](y), if y 6= x.
And since z 6∈ FV(ϕ), ρ(y) = ρ[z ← a](y).
(4): Base case. Obvious, since here ≡α coincides with equality.
Induction step. Assume ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀y.ψ, i.e., that ϕ[z/x] ≡α
ψ[z/y] for some z 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ). By (IH), FV(ϕ[z/x]) =
FV(ψ[y/z]), hence, by Proposition 1.(3), FV(ϕ) \ {x} ∪ {z} =
FV(ψ) \ {x} ∪ {z}; because z 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ), this implies
FV(ϕ) \ {x} = FV(ψ) \ {x}, i.e., FV(∀x.ϕ) = FV(∀x.ψ).
Points (5)-(11) shall be proved together. In the case of (5), we
prove by induction two properties - reexivity and transitivity -
since symmetry holds by denition.
Base case.
(5) Reexivity and transitivity follow from the corresponding prop-
erties of equality.
(6) Subst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn), 1Var) = pi(Subst(T1, 1Var), . . . ,
Subst(Tn, 1Var)) = pi(T1, . . . , Tn), and thus
Subst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn, 1Var) ≡α pi(T1, . . . , Tn).
(7) and (8): Follow similarly to (6), but also using Proposition 1,
points (4) and (1), respectively.
(9) Obvious, since here ≡α is the equality.
(10) and (11): Follow similarly to (6), using properties (3) and (9)
in the denition of a term syntax.
Induction step:
(5) For reexivity, note that ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀x.ϕ holds because,
by (IH) for point (5), ϕ[z/x] ≡α ϕ[z/x]. In order to prove
transitivity, assume that ∀x1.ϕ1 ≡α ∀x2.ϕ2 and ∀x2.ϕ2 ≡α
∀x3.ϕ3. Then for some z 6∈ FV(ϕ1) ∪ FV(ϕ2) and z′ 6∈
FV(ϕ2) ∪ FV(ϕ3), it holds that ϕ1[z/x1] ≡α ϕ2[z/x2] and
ϕ2[z
′/x2] ≡α ϕ3[z′/x3]. Let z′′ 6∈ FV(ϕ1) ∪ FV(ϕ2) ∪ FV(ϕ3).
Then, by (IH) for points (7) and (9), we have the following
chain of α-equivalencies: ϕ1[z′′/x1] ≡α ϕ1[z/x1][z′′/z] ≡α
ϕ2[z/x2][z
′′/z] ≡α ϕ2[z′′/x1] ≡α . . . ≡α ϕ3[z′′/x3]. From
this, by (IH) for point (5), we get ϕ1[z′′/x1] ≡α ϕ3[z′′/x3];
thus we found the desired z′′ 6∈ FV(ϕ1) ∪ FV(ϕ3), yielding
∀x1.ϕ1 ≡α ∀x3.ϕ3.
(6) We need to prove that Subst(∀x.ϕ, 1Var) ≡α ∀x.ϕ, i.e., that
∀z.ϕ[z/x] ≡α ∀x.ϕ with z as in the denition of substitution. Let
z′ 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ϕ[z/x]), or equivalently, z′ 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ {z}.
Then, by (IH) for point (7), ϕ[z/x][z′/z] ≡α ϕ[z′/x] and we are
done.
(7) We need to prove that if y 6∈ FV(ϕ), then (∀u.ϕ)[y/x][z/y] ≡α
(∀u.ϕ)[z/x], i.e., ∀u′′.ϕ[u′/u][y/x][u′′/u][z/y] ≡α
∀u′′′.ϕ[u′′′/u][z/x], where u′, u′′, u′′′ are as in the denition
of substitution for each of the three cases. Let v 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪
{u′, u′′, u′′′}. It would sufce thatϕ[u′/u][y/x][u′′/u′][z/y][v/u′′]
≡α ϕ[u′′′/u][z/x]v/u′′′]; the latter is true by (IH) for point (11),
since [u′/u]; [y/x]; [u′′/u′]; [z/y]; [v/u′′] = [u′′′/u]; [z/x]; [v/u′′′].
(8) We need to show that if T 6∈ FV(∀u.ϕ), then (∀u.ϕ)[T/x] ≡α
∀u.ϕ, i.e., that ∀z.Subst(ϕ, [T/x][u← z]) ≡α ∀u.ϕ, where z is as
in the denition of substitution. Let z′ 6∈ FV(ϕ)∪{z}∪FV(T ). It
would sufce that Subst(ϕ, [T/x][u← z])[z′/z] ≡α ϕ[z′/u], i.e.,
by (IH) for point (11), that Subst(ϕ, [T/x][u← z]; [z′/z]) ≡α
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Subst(ϕ, [z′/u]). The latter follows by (IH) for point (10), since
[T/x][u← z′]FV(ϕ)= [z′/u]FV(ϕ).
(9) Assume ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀y.ψ, i.e., that ϕ[v/x] ≡α ψ[v/y] for
some v 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ). In order to prove Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) ≡α
Subst(∀y.ψ, θ), we take z, z′ as in the denition of substitution and
show that ∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) ≡α ∀z′.Subst(ψ, θ[y ← z′]).
For proving the latter, using (IH) for point (11), we take z′′ 6∈
FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ) and show that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]; [z′′/z]) ≡α
Subst(ψ, θ[y ← z′]; [z′′/z′]), i.e., that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′′]) ≡α
Subst(ψ, θ[y ← z′′]). Since [z′′/x]; θ[x ← z′′] = θ[x ← z′′] and
[z′′/y]; θ[y ← z′′] = θ[x ← z′′], we reduce the desired equiva-
lence to Subst(ϕ, [z′′/x]; θ[x← z′′]) ≡α
Subst(ψ, [z′′/y]; θ[y ← z′′]), and furthermore, by (IH) for point
(11), to Subst(ϕ[z′′/x], θ[x← z′′]) ≡α Subst(ψ[z′′/y], θ[y ← z′′]).
Now, by (IH) for point (7), we have thatϕ[z′′/x] ≡α ϕ[v/x][z′′/v]
≡α ψ[v/y][z′′/v] ≡α ψ[z′′/y]; moreover, by (IH) for point (10),
from θ[x← z′′]FV(ϕ[z′′/x])= θFV(ϕ[z′′/x]), we get
Subst(ϕ[z′′/x], θ[x← z′′]) ≡α Subst(ϕ[z′′/x], θ) and similarly
Subst(ψ[z′′/y], θ[y ← z′′]) ≡α Subst(ψ[z′′/y], θ). Now by (IH)
for point (5), we reduce what we need to prove to Subst(ϕ[v/z], θ) =
Subst(ϕ[v/y], θ), which holds by (IH) for point (9).
(10) Assume θ FV(∀x.ϕ)= θ′ FV(∀x.ϕ). In order to prove that
Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ′), note rst that the variable z
in the denition of substitution is the same in the two cases, and we
need to show ∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) ≡α ∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ′[x← z]),
i.e., by (IH) for point (11), that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]; [z′/z]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, θ′[x← z]; [z′/z]), i.e., that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, θ′[x← z′]). The latter is true by (IH) for point (10), since
θ[x← z′]FV(ϕ)= θ′[x← z′]FV(ϕ).
(11) In order to prove that Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ; θ′) ≡α
Subst(Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ), θ′), let z, z′, z′′ as in the denition of sub-
stitution (for each of the three involved substitutions). We need to
show that ∀z.Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z]) ≡α
∀z′′.Subst(Subst(ϕ[x← z′], θ), θ′[z′ ← z′′]), i.e., that
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z])[z′′′/z]] ≡α
Subst(Subst(ϕ[x← z′], θ), θ′[z′ ← z′′])[z′′′/z′′], where z′′′ 6∈
FV(ϕ) ∪ {z, z′, z′′}. Indeed, using (IH) for point (11) and the
freshness of z, z′, z′′, z′′′), we have the following chain of α-
equivalencies and equalities:
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z])[z′′′/z] ≡α
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z]; [z′′′/z]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z′′′]) =
Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]; θ′[z′ ← z′′′]) =
Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]; θ′[z′ ← z′′]; [z′′′/z′′]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]; θ′[z′ ← z′′])[z′′′/z′′],
which by (IH) for point (5) yield the desired result.
(12): The cases of logical connectors are obvious. Assume now
ϕ ≡α ϕ′. Then, by point (9), ϕ[z/x] ≡α ϕ′[z/x] for any x and z,
in particular ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀x.ψ. 
THEOREM 1. The Gentzen system G is sound and complete for
generic rst-order logic.
Proof: Soundness: We need to check that the rules are sound. We
only consider the quantier rules, since the soundness of the others
follows standardly. Let A be a model. For soundness of (∀Left),
it sufces that A∀x.ϕ ⊆ Aϕ[T/x], which is true because of the
following: ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ is equivalent to ρ[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ for all
a ∈ A, which implies ρ[x ← AT (ρ)] ∈ Aϕ, which in turn is
equivalent, by Proposition 2.(2), to ρ ∈ Aϕ[T/x].
For (∀Right), we shall tacitly use Proposition 2.(1,2) several
times. Assume
T
χ∈Γ Aχ ⊆
S
ψ∈∆ Aψ ∪ Aϕ[y/x], where y is not
free in Γ,∆, ∀x.ϕ. We need to show Tχ∈Γ Aχ ⊆ Sψ∈∆ Aψ ∪
A∀x.ϕ. For this, let ρ ∈
T
χ∈Γ Aχ such that ρ 6∈
S
ψ∈∆ Aψ , and
let us show that ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ, i.e., that ρ[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ for all
a ∈ A. Let a ∈ A. Because ρ[y ← a]FV(χ)= ρFV(χ) for each
χ ∈ Γ ∪ ∆ (since y 6∈ FV(χ)), we have ρ[y ← a] ∈ Tχ∈Γ Aχ
and ρ[y ← a] 6∈ Sψ∈∆ Aψ . Thus ρ[y ← a] ∈ Aϕ[y/x], i.e.,
ρ[y ← a][x ← Aρ[y←a](y)] ∈ Aϕ, i.e., ρ[y ← a][x ← a] ∈ Aϕ.
If y = x, we get ρ[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ, as desired. On the other hand
if y 6= x, then ρ[y ← a][x ← a] = ρ[x ← a][y ← a], hence
ρ[x ← a][y ← a] ∈ Aϕ; and since ρ[x← a][y ← a] FV(ϕ)=
ρ[x← a]FV(ϕ), we get ρ[x← a] ∈ Aϕ, again as desired.
Completeness: The proof mainly follows a classical line (see
[7]). Its only slightly specic part will be the one of constructing a
model from a Hintikka signed set (sets Hleft and Hright below).
Assume that Γ . ∆ is a tautological sequent. Call a sequent
hopeless if it is not an axiom and no rule can be applied backwards
to it.10 Note that a hopeless sequent Γ′ . ∆′ is one such that
Γ′ ∩∆′ = ∅ and Γ′,∆′ consist of atomic formulae; such a sequent
is falsiable, as shown below: let ρ be the identity valuation 1Var in
a Herbrand model that denes its relations as to make all formulae
in Γ′ true and all formulae in ∆′ false; this is possible precisely
because Γ′ and ∆′ are disjoint sets of atomic formulae.
As in [7], we construct backwards from Γ . ∆ a possibly in-
nite proof tree, roughly by expanding the nodes not labelled with
axioms or hopeless sequents via a fair application of rules to se-
quents. Special care needs to be taken when considering the (∀Left)
rule, since when the turn of this rule comes according to the con-
sidered fair scheduler, a counter n associated to the correspond-
ing formula in Γ needs to be increased, and the rule needs to be
applied for each of the rst n terms (w.r.t., say, the lexicographic
order). Moreover, dovetailing needs to be applied to the elements
of Γ and ∆, provided these sets are innite: x an order on the
set, and rst consider the rst element, then the rst two elements
etc. The (rather tedious) details are provided in [7] - the important
thing is that these details are all independent of the concrete syntax
of terms.
If the obtained tree is nite and all its leaves are labelled with
axioms, the tree is completed, hence we have a proof for Γ . ∆, as
desired. If the tree is nite and there is a hopeless leaf falsiable
by some valuation ρ in a model M , then by the way rules in G
were dened (to hold in an iff form), it follows that Γ . ∆ itself
is falsiable by ρ in M . It remains to consider the case of an
innite tree. If we prove that Γ . ∆ is falsiable, then we are done.
Consider the labels Γi . ∆i of an arbitrarily chosen innite path
in the tree, with Γ=Γ and ∆=∆; by the construction of the tree,
these labels do not include any axiom. If we set Hleft =
S
i∈IN Γi
and Hright =
S
i∈IN ∆i, we get the following properties by the fair
way in which rules were applied backwards in the construction of
the tree:
• ¬ϕ ∈ Hleft implies ϕ ∈ Hright;
• ¬ϕ ∈ Hright implies ϕ ∈ Hleft;
• ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Hleft implies ϕ ∈ Hleft and ψ ∈ Hleft;
• ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Hright implies ϕ ∈ Hright or ψ ∈ Hright;
• ϕ⇒ ψ ∈ Hleft implies ϕ ∈ Hright or ψ ∈ Hleft;
• ϕ⇒ ψ ∈ Hright implies ϕ ∈ Hleft and ψ ∈ Hright;
• ∀x.ϕ ∈ Hleft implies for all T ∈ Term, ϕ[T/x] ∈ Hleft;
• ∀x.ϕ ∈ Hright implies there exists y ∈ Var with ϕ[y/x] ∈
Hright (in particular, there exists T ∈ Term with ϕ[T/x] ∈
Hright).
10 The proof trees are assumed to grow by backwards application of the
rules, in the sense that a leaf is matched against a conclusion of the rule,
and then the hypotheses of the rule are added to the tree.
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Moreover, because the considered innite path does not contain
(nodes labelled with) axioms and because both the Γi's and the
∆i's are totally ordered by inclusion w.r.t. their atomic formulae, it
holds that Hleft ∩Hright ∩ Atomic Formulae = ∅.
In order to falsify Γ . ∆, it sufces to falsify Hleft . Hright.
We dene a Herbrand model A by letting (T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Api iff
pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hleft, and take the valuation ρ : Var → A to
be again 1Var. We prove by structural induction on ϕ the following
statement: [ϕ ∈ Hleft implies A |=ρ ϕ] and [ϕ ∈ Hright implies
A 6|=ρ ϕ]. If ϕ has the form pi(T1, . . . , Tn), then by the denition
of A, A |=ρ pi(T1, . . . , Tn) iff pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hleft. In partic-
ular, pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hleft implies A |=ρ pi(T1, . . . , Tn). More-
over, since pi(T1, . . . , Tn) is atomic and because ofHleft∩Hright∩
Atomic Formulae = ∅, it cannot happen that pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈
Hright and A |=ρ pi(T1, . . . , Tn), thus pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hright
implies A 6|=ρ pi(T1, . . . , Tn). The case of the logical connec-
tives is straightforward. Assume now ϕ has the form ∀x.ψ. From
∀x.ψ ∈ Hleft we infer that ψ[T/x] ∈ H left for each term T (i.e.,
for each element T of A), and furthermore, by the induction hy-
potheses, that A |=ρ ψ[T/x], i.e., ρ ∈ Aψ[T/x], i.e., by Proposi-
tion 2.(2), ρ[x ← Aρ(T )] ∈ Aψ , i.e., ρ[x ← T ] ∈ Aϕ, for each
T ∈ A; thusA |=ρ ∀x.ψ. That ∀x.ψ ∈ Hright impliesA 6|=ρ ∀x.ψ
can be proved similarly.
Thus Γ . ∆ is falsiable and the proof is nished. 
THEOREM 2. The Gentzen system G= is sound and complete for
generic rst-order languages with equality.
Proof: Soundness: We only check soundness of the rule regarding
substitution. Let A and ρ such that AT1(ρ) = AT2(ρ) for each
i ∈ {1, n}. Then by point (c).(ii) in the denition of models,
AT [T ′/x](ρ) = AT (ρ[x ← AT ′(ρ)]) = AT (ρ[x ← AT1(ρ)]) =
AT [T2/x](ρ).
Completeness: One can see that the effect of adding the equal-
ity rules amounts to adding the axioms Eql in the antecedent of
sequents. Thus Γ . ∆ is provable in G= iff Γ′ ∪ Γ . ∆ is provable
in G.
Now, given any model A in the language without equality (i.e.,
in the language that contains =, but treats this symbol as just an
ordinary binary relation symbol) that satises Eql, one denes the
relation≡ by a ≡ b iffA |=ρ x = y for some ρ with ρ(x) = a and
ρ(y) = b. Due to satisfaction of Eql by A, ≡ is an equivalence
compatible with the relations Api and with the substitution, the
latter in the sense that whenever AT1(ρ) = AT2(ρ), it holds that
AT [T1/x](ρ) = AT [T2/x](ρ). Thus we can speak about a quotient
model A/≡ and dene, for each ρ : Var → A, ρ′ : Var → A/≡
by ρ′(x) = ρ(x)/≡. Then a simple induction on ϕ shows that
A/≡ |=ρ′ ϕ iff A |=ρ ϕ. It follows that Γ . ∆ is tautological
in the logic with equality iff Γ′ ∪ Γ . ∆ is tautological in the logic
without equality.
Completeness of G= now follows from completeness of G. 
Below, by proof tree we mean completed proof tree.
LEMMA 1. Assume that GE is closed under the rules (Drop-
(e, a)). If Γ . ∆1 ∪ ∆2 is derivable in GE , then either Γ . ∆1
or Γ . ∆2 is derivable in GE .
Proof: We prove the statement by induction on the size of a
minimal proof tree for Γ . ∆1 ∪∆2.
If Γ . ∆1 ∪ ∆2 is an axiom, then Γ ∩ (∆1 ∪ ∆2) 6= ∅, thus
Γ ∩∆1 6= ∅ or Γ ∩∆1 6= ∅, making Γ . ∆1 or Γ . ∆2 an axiom.
If Γ . ∆1 ∪∆2 followed by an application of an (Inst-e) rule,
then assume w.l.g. that ∆2 = ∆′2 ∪ {c(T )} and Γ . ∆1 ∪ ∆2
followed from Γ ∪ {ai(z, T )} . ∆1 ∪ ∆′2 ∪ {bi(x, T )}, with
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By the induction hypothesis, for each i, either
Γai(z, T ) . ∆1, or Γai(z, T ) . ∆′2bi(x, T ). If the former is the
case for at least one i, then since GE is closed under (Drop-
(e, ai)), we get that Γ . ∆1 is derivable. Otherwise Γai(z, T ) .
∆′2bi(x, T ) for all i, hence, by the (Inst-e) rule, Γ . ∆′2c(T ), i.e.,
Γ . ∆2, is derivable. 
LEMMA 2. GE and G1E are equivalent (i.e., (Simple-Cut) can be
eliminated from G1E).
Proof: We show that for each proof tree for Γ . ∆ having an appli-
cation of the (Simple-Cut) rule only once, at the root, there exists a
proof tree for Γ . ∆ that does not use this rule at all. Assume such
a proof tree T starting with an application of (Simple-Cut) - then
Γ . ∆ followed from Γ . d and Γd . ∆.
If Γd . ∆ is an axiom, then either ∆ ∩ Γ 6= ∅, meaning Γ . ∆
is an axiom, or d ∈ ∆, meaning that the proof tree of Γ . d, which
does not use (Simple-Cut) can be made into a proof tree of Γ . ∆
that does not use (Simple-Cut) either.
Assume now that ∆ = ∆′∪{c(T )} and Γd . ∆ followed from
Γ d ai(z, T ) . ∆
′bi(z, T ). We obtain a proof tree T ′ for Γ . ∆
by switching the applications of (Simple-Cut) and (Inst-e). More
precisely, we derive Γ . ∆ from Γ ai(z, T ) . ∆′bi(z, T ), and each
Γ ai(z, T ) . ∆
′bi(z, T ) from Γai(z, T ) . d and Γ d ai(z, T ) .
∆′bi(z, T ), where the proof of Γai(z, T ) . d is copied from the
one of Γ . d. Applying the induction hypothesis for the proof trees
(strictly smaller than T ) of Γ d ai(z, T ) .
∆′bi(z, T ), we can assume that they do not use (Simple-Cut),
and we are done. 
PROPOSITION 5. If GE is closed under the rules (Drop-(e, a)),
then it is also closed under (Cut), i.e., then GE is equivalent to
G0E .
Proof: Consider a proof tree of Γ . ∆ in GE , such that the (Cut)
rule was applied only ones, at the root. Then Γ . ∆ followed from
Γ . ∆d and Γd . ∆, where both latter sequents are derivable in
GE . By Lemma 1, either Γ . ∆ or Γ . d is derivable in GE . The
former case is precisely what we need to prove; in the latter case,
Γ . d, and thus Γ . ∆, are derivable in G1E , i.e., by Lemma , in GE .
THEOREM 3. If GE is closed under the rules (Drop-(e, a)), then
KE is complete for deducing E-tautological sequents Γ . d, with
Γ nite set of atomic formulae and d atomic formula.
Proof: Follows at once from Proposition 5, noticing that in the
system GE , if the sequent Γ . a is derivable, then all the sequents
Γ′ . ∆′ used in the proof tree have ∆′ a singleton - in other words,
GE is a conservative extension of KE . 
PROPOSITION 6. All the theoriesE in Subsection 3.1 are amenable,
and thus K=E is complete for any of them.
Proof: We only sketch a proof for the specication SF of System
F. The cases of the other specications, including their versions
that contain declarations of constants of various types or kinds
and equations that dene their behavior, can be treated similarly,
as they all need to drop atomic formulae like typeOf (x, T ) or
kindOf (t,K), with x and t fresh variables. The trick used in the
below proof of restricting the troubling rules works in all these
cases, because the troubling rules for all these specications are
the same, namely the ones that come from the equality axioms of
transitivity, compatibility and substitution. After the restriction, a
straightforward induction for proving closure under the drop rules
works ne in each case.
Thus let us prove amenability of SF . The only type of drop
rules Drop-(e, a) come from e being [Abs] or (ξ) and a(x, T ) being
typeOf (x, T ), with x fresh. Thus we need to prove closure under
22 2006/7/28
Γ typeOf (z, T ) . ∆
Γ . ∆
(with z fresh) of the following Gentzen system, where the nota-
tional conventions from the denition of SF apply, and where Γ
and ∆ denote, as usual, nite sets of atomic sentences:
·
Γ . ∆
if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ [Axiom]
Γ typeOf (x, T ) . ∆ typeOf (X,T ′)
Γ . ∆ typeOf ((λx :T.X), T → T ′) [Inst-Abs]
Γ . ∆ typeOf (X,T )
Γ . ∆ typeOf (λt.X,Πt.T ) [Inst-T-Abs]
Γ . ∆ typeOf (X,T → T ′) ,
Γ . ∆ typeOf (Y, T )
Γ . ∆ typeOf (XY, T ′) [Inst-App]
Γ . ∆ typeOf (X,Πt.T )
Γ . ∆ typeOf (XT ′, T [t← T ′]) [Inst-T-App]
·
Γ . ∆X = X
(Inst-Re)
Γ . ∆X = Y
Γ . ∆Y = X
(Inst-Symm)
Γ . ∆X = Y , Γ . ∆Y = Z
Γ . ∆X = Z
(Inst-Trans)
·
Γ . ∆T = T
(Inst-T-Re)
Γ . ∆T = T ′
Γ . ∆T ′ = T (Inst-T-Symm)
Γ . ∆T = T ′ , Γ . ∆T ′ = T ′′
Γ . ∆T = T ′′ (Inst-T-Trans)
Γ . ∆X = Y , Γ . ∆T = T ′ ,
Γ . ∆ typeOf (X,T )
Γ . ∆ typeOf (Y, T ′) (Inst-ComptypeOf)
Γ . ∆X = Y
Γ . ∆Z[z ← X] = Z[z ← Y ] (Inst-Subst)
Γ . ∆T = T ′
Γ . ∆T ′′[t← T ] = T ′′[t← T ′] (Inst-T-Subst)
Γ typeOf (x, T ) . ∆X = Y
Γ . ∆λx : T.X = λx : T.Y
(Inst-ξ)
Γ . ∆X = Y
Γ . ∆λt.X = λt.Y
(Inst-T-ξ)
Γ . ∆ typeOf ((λx : T.X)Y, T ′)
Γ . ∆ (λx : T.X)Y = X[x← Y ] (Inst-β)
Γ . ∆ typeOf ((λt.X)T, T ′)
Γ . ∆ (λt.X)T = X[t← T ] (Inst-T-β)
Γ . ∆ typeOf (λy : T.Xy, T ′)
Γ . ∆X = λy : T.Xy
(Inst-η)
Γ . ∆ typeOf (λt.Xt, T ′)
Γ . ∆X = λt.Xt
(Inst-T-η)
The side-conditions of the above rules are the following:
• At [Inst-Abs] and (Inst-ξ), x does not occur (free) in Γ ∪∆;
• At [Inst-T-Abs] and (Inst-T-ξ), t does not occur in Γ ∪∆;
• At (Inst-η), y 6∈ FV(X);
• At (Inst-T-η), t 6∈ FV(X).
As expected, the above system of rules is obtained from K=SF
of Section 3.2 by adding nite sets ∆ of atomic formulae to the
succedents (here we write typeOf  rather than : though).
Now, an argument for Γ . typeOf (z, T ′′)∆ (with z fresh)
derivable implies Γ . ∆ derivable, inductive on the structure of
a completed proof tree of Γ . typeOf (z, T ′′)∆, almost works. For
example, the induction step for rule [Inst-Abs] goes as follows:
Assume Γ . typeOf (z, T ′′)∆ was derived via [Inst-Abs] from
Γ typeOf (z, T ′′) typeOf (x, T ) . ∆′ typeOf (X,T ′), where ∆ =
∆′ typeOf (λx : T.X, T → T ′). By the side-condition of [Inst-
Abs], x is fresh for Γ typeOf (z, T ′′), and thus z is different from x.
Moreover, since FV(typeOf (X.T ′)) \ FV(typeOf (λx :T.X, T →
T ′)) ⊆ {x} and z is fresh for typeOf (λx : T.X, T → T ′), it fol-
lows that z is fresh for typeOf (X,T ′). We obtained z fresh both for
Γ typeOf (x, T ) and for ∆′ typeOf (X.T ′), and thus, by the induc-
tive hypothesis, Γ typeOf (x, T ) . ∆′ typeOf (X,T ′) is derivable,
making Γ . ∆′ typeOf (λx : T.X, T → T ′), i.e., Γ . ∆, derivable,
as desired.
The only problems are caused by the rules (Inst-Trans), (Inst-
ComptypeOf), and (Inst-Subst) - as they are, these rules cannot be
considered in a straightforward induction, because they might have
more data variables in their hypotheses than in their conclusion.
However these rules can readily be replaced by apparently weaker
rules, obtained from them by adding the following side-conditions:
• At (Inst-Trans): FV(Y ) ⊆ FV(X) ∪ FV(Z) ∪ FV(Γ);
• At (Inst-ComptypeOf) : FV(X) ⊆ FV(Y ) ∪ FV(Γ);
• At (Inst-Subst): Z[z ← X] and Z[z ← Y ] are syntactically
different.
Now the induction step works smoothly for these rules as well. 
LEMMA 3. The forgetful mapping (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ(A)) to (A,
〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ) is a bijection, preserving satisfaction and each
of the properties (P5),(P6), between pre-structures verifying (P1)-
(P4) and (P7) and simple pre-structures verifying (P1)-(P4).
Proof: The inverse of the forgetful function maps simple pre-
structures (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ) verifying (P1)-(P4) to (A, 〈 〉,
(AT )T∈Λ(A)), where for each term T in Λ, sequence of elements
a1, . . . , an in A and sequence of distinct variables x1, . . . , xn,
AT [a1/x1,...,an/xn](ρ) is, by denition,AT (ρ[x1 ← a1, . . . , xn ←
an]). This denition is correct, because any term in Λ(A) has
the form T [a1/x1, . . . , an/xn] for some T , and AT (ρ[x1 ←
a1, . . . , xn ← an]) does not depend on the choice of T . A
simple induction on the structure of Λ(A) terms shows that
AT [a1/x1,...,an/xn](ρ) is indeed equal toAT (ρ[x1 ← a1, . . . , xn ←
an]) in any pre-structure, and thus the two mappings are mutually
inverse.
These mappings preserve satisfaction, since satisfaction is basi-
cally the same in each two structures related by these mappings -
note also that in pre-structures only satisfaction of Λ-term equali-
ties is dened. As for properties (P5) and (P6), one needs another
induction to prove that in a pre-structure, verifying these properties
w.r.t. Λ-terms is sufcient for them to hold w.r.t. Λ(A)-terms; here
one uses again the equality AT [a1/x1,...,an/xn](ρ) = AT (ρ[x1 ←
a1, . . . , xn ← an]). 
LEMMA 4. Each of the schemes of formulae (β), (η), (ext) is
semantically equivalent in GFOL to its primed variant.
Proof: Since (β′), (η′) and (ext) are instances of the schemes (β),
(η) and (ext), all we need to show is that the latter follow from the
former; and this simply holds because in our logic it is sound to
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infer ϕ(T ) from ∀y.ϕ(y), and by the way substitution in formulae
was dened. 
PROPOSITION 7. The above two mappings are well dened and
mutually inverse. Moreover, they preserve satisfaction and they can
be restricted and corestricted to:
(a) λ-models versus GFOL models satisfying (ξ), (β);
(b) extensional λ-models versus GFOL models satisfying (ξ), (β), (η).
Proof: We show that L# is a GFOL model. Two of the GFOL
model axioms, (c).(i) and (c).(iii), are precisely (P1) and (P3). The
remaining axiom, (c).(ii), can be written asAT [T1/x1,...,Tn/xn](ρ) =
AT (ρ[x1 ← AT1(x1), . . . , ATn(xn)]). We check this by lexico-
graphic induction on two criteria: the depth of T , and then the
number n. The cases with T variable and T of the form T ′ T ′′ are
simple, and they use (P1) and (P2). Assume now that T has the
form λx.T ′. Since we work modulo α-equivalence, we can assume
that x is not free in any of T1, . . . , Tn.
• If x 6∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, then T [T/x] = λx.(T ′[T/x]). Thus we
need to checkAλx.(T ′[T/x])(ρ) = Aλx.T ′(ρ[x← AT (ρ)]). By
(P4), it is sufcient to consider a ∈ A and proveAT ′[T/x](ρ[x←
a]) = Aλx.T ′(ρ[x ← AT (ρ), x ← a]), i.e., AT ′[T/x](ρ[x ←
a]) = Aλx.T ′(ρ[x ← a][x ← AT (ρ)]), which is true by the
induction hypothesis applied to T ′ and ρ[x← a].
• If x ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, say x = x1, then T [T/x] = T [T2/x2, . . . ,
Tn/xn] and by the induction hypothesis (second criterion),
T [T2/x2, . . . , Tn/xn] = AT (ρ[x2 ← AT2(x1), . . . , xn ←
ATn(xn)]. Finally, because x 6∈ FV(T ), the valuations ρ1 =
ρ[x ← AT (ρ)] and ρ2 = ρ[x2 ← AT2(x1), . . . , xn ←
ATn(xn)] coincide on FV(T ), hence, by (P3), AT (ρ1) =
AT (ρ2) and we are done.
(Above, we used the obvious tuple notations x for (x1, . . . , xn), T
for (T1, . . . , Tn) etc.) L# satises (ξ) because (P4) is nothing else
but a semantic statement of (ξ).
We show that M$ is a λ-model. Properties (P1) and (P3) are
required for generic models as well, hence they hold. (P2) holds
as an instance of the axiom (c).(ii) of GFOL models: AT1 T2(ρ) =
Ax1x2[T1/x1,T2/x2](ρ) = Ax1x2([ρ[x1 ← AT1(ρ), x2 ← AT2(ρ)]) =
AT1(ρ)〈AT2(ρ)〉. (We also used the denition of 〈 〉.) Again, (P4)
holds in M$ because M satises (ξ).
That # and $ are mutually inverse follows from the fact that
a〈b〉 = Axy(ρ), with ρ mapping x to a and y to b, holds in any
pre-structure verifying (P1)-(P4).
In order to see that the pre-structure is a λ-model (i.e., it also
veries (P5) iff the corresponding GFOL model satises (β), note
that (P5) is just a semantic statement of (β′), which is equivalent
to (β) by Lemma 4. Similarly, extensional λ-models correspond to
(β) ∪ (η)-GFOL models because of the following:
• under the (β), (ξ) assumptions, (η) is equivalent to (ext);
• (ext) is equivalent to (ext′) by Lemma 4;
• (ext′) is just a semantic statement of (P6).
Finally, both # and $ preserve satisfaction since it has the same
denition for equations in pre-structures and generic models. 
PROPOSITION 8. For all typing judgements Γ . X : T ,
`SF Γ . X : T iff SF `=GFOL Γ# ⇒ typeOf(X,T ).11
Proof: Let T SF denote the typing fragment of SF , i.e., the
one consisting of axioms whose labels were enclosed into brack-
ets: [Abs], [T-Abs], [App], [T-App]. SF was proved amenable
11 Recall that we identify GFOL-formulae with their universal closures.
at Proposition 6 by showing that G=SF is closed under the drop
rules; the proof was performed by induction on the structure of a
proof tree in G=SF , by considering an induction step for each of
its rules; this proof works unchanged for the strict subset of these
rules forming GT SF , and thus we obtain that GT SF is closed un-
der the drop rules, making KT SF complete by Theorem 3. More-
over, the rules of KT SF can be seen to coincide with those of
the System-F's original typing, i.e., the KT SF 's [Axiom], [Inst-
Abs], [Inst-T-Abs], [Inst-App], and [Inst-T-App] are nothing but
the System-F's [SF-InVar], [SF-Abs], [SF-T-App], [SF-T-Abs], and
[Inst-T-App], modulo the notation x :T for typeOf (x, T ). We thus
obtain `SF Γ . X : T iff T SF `GFOL Γ# ⇒ typeOf (X,T ) for
all typing judgements Γ . X : T . Finally, notice that the axioms of
SF others than those of T SF do not affect typing, i.e., SF `=GFOL
Γ# ⇒ typeOf (X,T ) iff T SF `GFOL Γ# ⇒ typeOf (X,T ). 
LEMMA 5. Henkin and 1-Henkin models are equivalent, in that
there exists a satisfaction- preserving and reecting surjection &1
between the class of Henkin models and that of 1-Henkin models.
That is to say: for all Henkin models H and well-typed equation
Γ . X = Y : T ,
H |= Γ . X = Y : T iff H&1 |= Γ . X = Y : T.
Proof: The mapping &1 makes disjoint copies of the Domσ's
whenever necessary, curries the functions Appσ,τ and Appf , and
deletes from F all functions that do not come from terms. &1 pre-
serves and reects satisfaction because satisfaction only considers
functions in F that come from terms, and hence it relays on the
same structure for H as for H&1 . &1 is a surjection because any
Henkin model with disjoint domainsDomσ and all functions com-
ing from terms yields a 1-Henkin model by uncurring. 
LEMMA 6. 1-Henkin and 2-Henkin models are equivalent, in that
there exist two satisfaction- preserving and reecting mappings &12
and &21 between the two classes of models.
Proof: &12 maps a 1-Henkin model to a 2-Henkin model by forget-
tingF and Π and by dening AppHΠt.T (γ) to be Appτ 7→HT (γ[τ←t]);
the denition is correct by property (6) in the denition of 1-
Henkin models. Conversely, &21 maps a 2-Henkin model to a 1-
Henkin model by dening F as at point (c) in the denition of
1-Henkin models, and Appf by AppHΠt.T (γ) if f has the form
τ 7→ HT (γ[t ← τ ]). Satisfaction is seen to be precisely the same
in corresponding 1-Henkin and 2-Henkin models. 
LEMMA 7. 2-Henkin and 3-Henkin models are equivalent, in that
there exist two satisfaction- preserving and reecting mappings &23
and &32 between the two classes of models.
Proof: Let H be a 2-Henkin model. The 3-Henkin model &23(H)
is dened as follows: D = SDom. App(d, d′) = Appτ,σ(d, d′)
if there exist τ, σ such that d ∈ Domτ and d′ ∈ Domσ
and App(d, d′) arbitrary otherwise; the denition is correct be-
cause, thanks to disjointness of the Domτ 's and injectivity of
→, there can be at most one pair (τ, σ) as above. Similarly,
TApp(d, τ) = AppHΠt.T (γ)(d, τ) if there exist t, T, γ such that d ∈DomHΠt.T (γ). The relation typeOf is the following: typeOf (d, τ)
iff d ∈ Domτ . Everything else remains the same.
Conversely, let H be a 3-Henkin model. The 2-Henkin model
&32(H) is dened as follows: Domσ = {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, σ)}.
Appτ,σ is the restriction and corestriction of App to Domτ→σ ×
Domτ → Domσ; the correctness of this denition is ensured
by property (2) in the denition of 3-Henkin models. Similarly,
TAppHΠt.T (γ) is the restriction and corestriction of TApp toDomHΠt.T (γ)×T → D, with correctness ensured by property (3)
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in the denition of 3-Henkin models. Everything else remains the
same.
Note that &32◦α23 is the identity mapping, thus 2-Henkin models
are somehow more concise than 3-Henkin models. Again, there
is nothing to prove about preservation an reection of satisfaction,
since again the satisfaction relation is the same in two correspond-
ing models. 
LEMMA 8. Let H be a 3-Henkin model, γ : TVar → T and
δ : DVar → D. Then there for any two pairs (Γ, T ) and (Γ′, T ′)
such that ` Γ . X : T and ` Γ′ . X : T ′ such that HΓ . X:T and
HΓ′ . X:T ′ are dened on (γ, δ), it holds that HΓ . X:T (γ, δ) =
HΓ′ . X:T ′(γ, δ).
Proof: Easy induction on the derivation of typing judgements;
the idea is that all the information needed for interpreting X is
already in the valuation (γ, δ), and Γ and T can only conrm
this information. 
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